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Reference ID Subject Created Released Classification Origin
06CAIRO3874 GOE PROSECUTES STATE SECURITY OFFICER ON TORTURE 2006-06-21 2011-02-03 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Cairo
07CAIRO3155 SCENESETTER FOR FBI DEPUTY DIRECTOR JOHN PISTOLE 2007-10-30 2011-02-03 SECRET Embassy Cairo
07CAIRO3449 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH MEETS WITH EGYPT'S STATE 2007-12-10 2011-02-03 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Cairo
08CAIRO2371 REQUESTING DEPARTMENT ASSISTANCE TO RESTORE 2008-11-18 2011-02-03 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Cairo
09CAIRO624 SCENESETTER FOR FBI DIRECTOR MUELLER 2009-04-13 2011-02-03 SECRET Embassy Cairo
09CAIRO814 NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT 2009-05-13 2011-02-03 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Cairo
10CAIRO47 SCENESETTER FOR A/S POSNER'S JANUARY 12-15 2010-01-06 2011-02-03 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Cairo
10SANAA222 IN ADEN, NEWSPAPER HEADQUARTERS STILL BLACKENED 2010-02-03 2011-02-03 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Sanaa
08LONDON630 IRAN NUCLEAR: UK COMMONS REPORT WILL CALL FOR DROPPING SUSPENSION; FCO DISCOUNTS REPORT'S IMPACT REF: A. LONDON 4204 B. EMBASSY DAILY OF JANUARY 31 C. 2008 D. GAYLE-NEA/IR FEBRUARY 29 E-MAIL 2008-02-29 2011-02-02 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy London
08LONDON1452 IRAN: FOREIGN SECRETARY SAYS UK TO LEAD FINANCIAL 2008-05-23 2011-02-02 SECRET Embassy London
09BRUSSELS854 JUNE GAERC - GUANTANAMO, IRELAND, THE MIDDLE EAST, 2009-06-19 2011-02-02 CONFIDENTIAL USEU Brussels
08TRIPOLI375 QADHAFI DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION: FATHI EL-JAHMI HAS RETURNED TO HIS HOME 2008-05-08 2011-02-01 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI401 FATHI EL-JAHMI REMAINS IN HOSPITAL, DESPITE REPORTS OF HIS RELEASE REF: A) JOHNSON-STEVENS EMAIL 05/12/2008, B) TRIPOLI 375, C) TRIPOLI 229, D) TRIPOLI 280 2008-05-15 2011-02-01 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI411 EMBASSY DENIED ACCESS TO DETAINED HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST 2008-05-22 2011-02-01 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI430 DIE HARD IN DERNA 2008-06-02 2011-02-01 CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI455 LIBYA: MEETING WITH RETURNED GTMO DETAINEES UNDER USG-GOL TRANSFER FRAMEWORK MOU REF: A) STATE 14270, B) 07 TRIPOLI 1060, C) 07 STATE 163961, D) 07 TRIPOLI 723, E) 07 STATE 77783, F) 07 STATE 163961 CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, Dept of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (c), (d) 1. (S/NF) Summary: Post visited two returned Guantanamo detainees to confirm their welfare and whereabouts, and the legal basis on which they are being detained in Libya. One detainee's trial has been completed and he is awaiting a verdict on the four charges he faces; the case of the second detainee is expected to go to trial in the next two to three months. End summary. 2. (S/NF) At a June 10 meeting, P/E Chief interviewed separately returned Guantanamo detainees Muhammad Abdallah Mansur al-Rimi (AKA Abdul Salam Abdul Omar Sufrani, ISN 194) and Ben Qumu Abu Sufian Ibrahim Ahmed Hamouda (ISN 557) per ref A instructions. The meeting took place at a GOL security service facility in Tripoli, and was attended by a host government security official. The last visit to the two returned detainees took place on December 25, 2007 (ref B). ISN 194 3. (S/NF) Al-Rimi (ISN 194), who was returned to Libya in December 2006, said he had been detained at an External Security Organization (ESO) detention facility between December 2006 and June 2007, when he was transferred to the Abu Salim prison, located in the Tripoli suburbs. The security official explained that the Abu Salim prison is controlled and managed by military police; it is the facility at which terrorists, extremists and other individuals deemed to be particularly dangerous to state security are detained. Al-Rimi said he remains in solitary detention in a 15 foot by 15 foot cell and has not been mistreated. He is able to walk outside regularly, and is able to speak with other prisoners during exercise periods. He is provided with drinking water, tea and three meals a day. He does not have access to books, radio or television. He has access to medications and has been visited by a prison doctor on the occasions when he has been ill. Al-Rimi stated that members of his family have visited him three times since his return to Libya, most recently in March 2008. (Note: As reported ref D, their previous visits were in January and May 2007. End note.) 4. (S/NF) Asked about the condition of his arm and his teeth, about which he had previously complained (ref D), al-Rimi said both were better. He repeated his earlier claim (ref A) that he sustained the injury to his arm in 2004 or 2005 during a scuffle with U.S. soldiers who entered his cell to punish him for allegedly instigating a disturbance among several other prisoners. 5. (S/NF) Asked for his understanding of the legal basis on which he is being held and the status/schedule of any legal proceedings against him, al-Rimi said he was questioned by the ESO and Internal Security Organization (ISO) officials between his return in December 2006 and February 2008, when his case was transferred to the Prosecutor General's office. His case has subsequently been been tried and is currently with a panel of judges, who are reviewing it. His understanding is that he faces four charges: 1) membership in the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group; 2) membership in al-Qaeda; 3) forging a passport and travel documents and using them to exit the country, and; 4) failing to secure permission to exit the country when he left to fight in Afghanistan. Al-Rimi has court-appointed legal counsel. The Prosecutor General's Office told al-Rimi and his attorney that the court was expected to render a verdict in his case on/about June 16. A verdict had been expected on/about May 5; however, the trial was delayed. Al-Rimi does not know how long his prison sentence could be if convicted of one or more of the charges he faces; however, he claimed his attorney told him he stood a good chance of being acquitted and released. ISN 557 6. (S/NF) Hamouda (ISN 557), who was returned to Libya in August 2007, said he had been detained at an ESO detention facility for three months and was then transferred to the Abu Salim prison. He currently remains at Abu Salim, but understands he may be transferred next month to the Jdeida prison, which houses common criminals, in Ain Zaraa. He has been held in solitary detention since his return - his biggest complaint - and said he has not been mistreated. (Note: The security official explained that detention protocols for extremists and terrorists mandate that they be held in solitary detention to preclude the possibility that they could recruit other members of the prison population for extremist activities. End note.) He is not able to exercise at the Abu Salim prison, but was able to do so at the ESO facility before he was transferred. He is provided with drinking water, tea and three meals a day. He does not have TRIPOLI 00000455 002 OF 002 access to books, radio or television. He has access to medications and has been told he may be visited by a prison doctor if he is ill, but has not had need of one. Hamouda has had two visits by members of his family since his return: his wife and children visited in late December, and his wife and brother-in-law in January. He complained that his family had not visited since, but said he he did not know whether they had tried. (Note: He conceded that his wife had divorced him and remarried, and that relations between them were difficult; however, after the second visit, permission for further visits had to be obtained from the Prosecutor General's office, vice ISO. He speculated that the Prosecutor General's office may have been less efficient in processing visit requests. End note.) 7. (S/NF) Asked for his understanding of the legal basis on which he is being held and the status/schedule of any legal proceedings against him, Hamouda said he was questioned by ESO and ISO officials between his return in August 2007 and May 2008, when his case was transferred to the Prosecutor General's Office. His understanding is that he faces three charges: 1) membership in the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group; 2) membership in al-Qaeda, and; 3) that he performed illicit work for a private company in Sudan and Afghanistan. He also faces charges related to a drug trafficking offense for which he was convicted and imprisoned in the early 1990's. According to the security official, Hamouda escaped from prison and left Libya illegally in 1992 to travel to Sudan; he may/may face separate charges for escaping and leaving the country. Hamouda has no legal counsel, but said he does not want an attorney because he has committed no crimes. Claiming that if he were really a member of al-Qaeda " ~ the U.S. would have never returned me to Libya ~ ", he said his impression is that all of the charges against him are based entirely on hearsay from witnesses whose credibility is suspect. He has been told by the Prosecutor General that his trial may start in two to three months. Hamouda does not know how long his prison sentence could be if convicted for one or more of the charges he faces; however, he claimed that he had been granted a pardon by the Qadhafi Development Foundation for the original drug trafficking conviction and his subsequent escape from prison and illegal exit from Libya. 2008-06-11 2011-02-01 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI458 CONDITIONS IN SECURITY DETENTION FACILITIES 2008-06-12 2011-02-01 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI467 DEVELOPMENTS IN CASE OF IDRISS BOUFAYED AND FELLOW REGIME 2008-06-16 2011-02-01 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI494 JOURNALIST JAILED FOR CRITICIZING GOVERNMENT'S 2008-06-22 2011-02-01 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI506 FATHI EL-JAHMI'S SON ASKS EMBASSY TO STOP VISITING HIM 2008-06-27 2011-02-01 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI515 LIBYAN LEADER AUTHOR OF HARD LINE ON DETAINED HUMAN RIGHTS 2008-07-01 2011-02-01 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI527 LIBYAN RESPONSE ON ARB-4 REVIEW PROCEEDINGS 2008-07-03 2011-02-01 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI530 LIBYA'S BERBER MINORITY STILL OUT IN THE COLD 2008-07-03 2011-02-01 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI541 EUROPEANS ENGAGE GOL ON BOUFAYED HUMAN RIGHTS CASE 2008-07-08 2011-02-01 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI588 LIBYA ENFORCES TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS AGAINST U.S. OFFICIALS REF: A) TRIPOLI 530, B) TRIPOLI 412, C) STATE 55839, D) TRIPOLI 478 (NOTAL), E) 07 TRIPOLI 165, F) TRIPOLI 515 CLASSIFIED BY: John T. Godfrey, CDA, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, Dept of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 1. (C) Summary: Four years after re-establishing diplomatic relations, the Government of Libya (GOL) remains deeply concerned about efforts to cover internal political issues and actively seeks to prevent Emboffs from traveling in-country and engaging with Libyans. The GOL has actively enforced new strictures to prevent certain foreign diplomats from traveling outside Tripoli without prior permission and a travel permit. The measures have been justified on security grounds; however, they appear to be largely motivated by a desire to circumscribe reporting on internal political issues and to specifically target U.S. diplomats. While perceptions of foreign interference are known to be a particularly neuralgic issue for the GOL, recent actions to limit our activities nonetheless go beyond the pale, the more so since since they appear to specifically target U.S. diplomats. Since March, there have been five instances of proposed in-country travel by Emboffs - involving five different officers and four different putative destinations - that the GOL has effectively blocked. Given that the regime's other recent measures on sensitive bilateral issues appear to have been authored at the highest levels, engagement by senior officials in Washington with their GOL interlocutors will likely be necessary to mitigate the current constraints on Post's ability to conduct in-country travel and engagement with Libyans. End comment. ATTEMPTS TO CONDUCT IN-COUNTRY TRAVEL, ENGAGEMENT STRIKE A NERVE 2. (C) As reported ref A, an attempt to visit the historical Berber heartland in March prompted an angry response from the MFA and a prohibition against travel to the city of Zuwara by Emboffs. MFA interlocutors angrily denounced Post's attempt to engage with the Berber community as "unacceptable interference" in Libya's domestic affairs. Following the Berber incident, CDA and P/E Chief spoke with MFA counterparts to clarify the mechanism by which proposed in-country travel could be coordinated through the MFA to avoid complications. 3. (C) Following the protocol established in those discussions, post proposed in early March that Poloff visit the southern city of Sabha (located some 650 km southeast of Tripoli, in the Fezzan Province) to meet with Libyan officials to discuss local government and migration issues. The MFA claimed to support the visit and offered to facilitate meetings with local Libyan officials. Post formally advised the MFA of Emboff's travel plans on March 30; however, on April 19, the MFA asked that the visit be delayed to allow additional time to arrange meetings with the Basic People's Congress in Sabha. The MFA also requested changes in the language of the diplomatic note advising the GOL of the proposed visit. Post sent a new diplomatic note, incorporating the MFA's suggested changes, on April 22 regarding Poloff's proposed visit to Sabha on May 6, and was in regular contact with the MFA concerning trip logistics from May 1-6. EMBOFF DETAINED TO PREVENT TRAVEL TO SABHA 4. (C) On May 6, Libyan security officials pulled Poloff out of line on the tarmac at Tripoli International Airport while he attempted to board a commercial flight from to Sabha. A plainclothes security official took Emboff's travel documents; other plainclothes security officials and uniformed police prevented Poloff from boarding the flight. A uniformed police officer told Poloff he was not allowed to wait on the tarmac and escorted him inside the terminal, where he was directed to report to the senior security official on site at the airport to retrieve his travel documents. Poloff was subsequently detained for approximately an hour in the senior security official's office, where he was surrounded by four to six uniformed and plainclothes security officials and two armed guards in uniform. Security officials attempted to question Poloff about his work at the Embassy and accused Poloff of not having a valid residence permit to remain in Libya. Poloff was told during the course of questioning that his luggage had not been loaded on the aircraft because security officials had decided well before the flight that he would not be allowed to travel. (Note: The MFA was aware that Poloff intended to travel on May 6 and gave no indication that there was any problem with the proposed trip. End note.) Nearly two hours after he was to have boarded the flight, security officials informed Poloff that he must "leave the airport immediately" without further explanation. 5. (C) Following the incident at the airport on May 6, the MFA TRIPOLI 00000588 002 OF 004 sent Post a diplomatic note asking that the Sabha trip be "delayed". A senior Libyan official told CDA on May 8 that while the MFA would attempt to coordinate with security officials to reschedule the visit, elements of the security apparatus, particularly the External Security Organization (ESO), were deeply uncomfortable with attempts by reporting officers to travel in-country and engage with Libyans outside of narrowly circumscribed official channels. To date, the MFA has not arranged the requested Sabha visit; Post has been informed that all Emboffs are currently banned from traveling to Libya's third largest city. MFA ATTEMPTS TO REQUIRE THAT ALL DIPLOMATS OBTAIN "PERMISSION" FOR IN-COUNTRY TRAVEL 6. (SBU) As reported ref B, the MFA sent to Western European and North American missions on May 19 a diplomatic note requiring that all diplomatic missions obtain "permission" (the Arabic wording is exact) for diplomats and/or members of their families to travel more than 70 km outside of Tripoli, regardless of the purpose of travel. Per guidance in ref C, Post has adopted a policy of notifying the GOL of travel by Emboffs and their families outside the 70 km radius. Add language on 'ya'ani greater Tripoli area" SECURITY SERVICES OBSTRUCT CHARGE'S TRAVEL TO BENGHAZI & POINTS EAST 7. (C) On May 23 - after receipt on May 19 of the MFA note requiring permission to travel and before receipt of ref C guidance on May 23 - security officials attempted to prevent CDA and two Emboffs from making a trip to Benghazi and eastern Libya for tourism. Four security officials, who identified themselves as External Security Organization (ESO) officials, met CDA inside the terminal at Tripoli International Airport and demanded to see his travel permit. Security officers were overheard discussing in Arabic the arrival of "the Americans" in the terminal. The officials noted that they were informed on May 22 that three Emboffs would attempt to travel to Benghazi. The ESO officials told CDA that the Emboffs would not be allowed to travel to Benghazi because they had not obtained permission to do so. CDA and Emboffs nonetheless attempted to check in for the flight; however, a security official physically went behind the airline counter to instruct the agent not to allow them to check in for their flight. After multiple phone calls to senior MFA and security officials, the security officials at the airport agreed to allow the officers to travel; however, they refused to allow Emboffs to ride on the same airport shuttle bus with other passengers and kept them under close observation. 8. (C) A Buraq Air agent told CDA and Emboffs during the encounter on May 23 that all Libyan-owned airlines with domestic service - Buraq Air, Libyan Arab Airlines, and Afriqiyah - received instructions from GOL officials in May that they were not to allow U.S. diplomats to board domestic flights from Tripoli without special permission from security organizations. The Buraq agent clarified that the instructions applied only to U.S diplomats, vice the entire diplomatic community. 9. (C) In Benghazi, security officials subjected CDA and Emboffs to a steady stream of harrassment. A security officer met CDA and Emboffs on the tarmac in Benghazi and immediately began questioning them about their trip. During a road trip from the Benghazi airport to Susa (some 200 km northeast), four security officials closely followed CDA and Emboffs. When they stopped at a scenic overlook, a security official in one of the chase cars got out and took numerous photographs of CDA, Emboffs and their locally-hired driver from a distance of five to ten feet. CDA confronted the official, who refused to identify himself and refused to stop taking photos. The same individual aggressively snapped hundreds of photographs of CDA, Emboffs, and the locally-engaged driver during the subsequent two days of their trip to eastern Libya. The driver, who is from Benghazi and is regularly used by Emboffs when they visit the east, said security officials routinely question him "for hours" after each visit by Emboffs and had instructed him to report any trip coordination with Emboffs at least 24 hours before their planned arrival in Benghazi. (Note: P/E Chief traveled to Benghazi and eastern Libya in early May and used the same driver, who is also used by PD officers when they travel in the east. End note.) Following Poloff's May 22 phone call to arrange a pick-up from the Benghazi airport, the driver had notified local security officials that the CDA and Emboffs planned to travel to Benghazi. TRIPOLI 00000588 003 OF 004 EMBOFFS DENIED "PERMISSION" TO TRAVEL IN SUPPORT OF U.S. PROGRAMS 10. (C) In late June, Post formally advised the MFA via diplomatic note that two Emboffs would accompany an Export Control and Border Security (EXBS) team to Benghazi, where they planned to conduct a three-day course on July 12-15 for 50 Libyan officials responsible for airport security and passenger screening. Post provided detailed information on Emboffs' proposed travel and clearly stated that they were to provide logistical support to the U.S. delegation. On July 9, the MFA informed Post via diplomatic note that Emboffs would not be permitted to travel to Benghazi in support of the EXBS training program (text of note sent via email to NEA/MAG). The note provided no explanation for denying permission to Emboffs to travel in support of the program. Post has cancelled the Benghazi portion of the airport security training course; a parallel EXBS airport security training program at the Tripoli International Airport is currently underway. In a meeting on July 15, MFA Americas Department Director Matari expressed frustration and conceded that such decisions were driven by security organizations, but said he would see what he could do to help. He advised that Emboffs seek in the interim to obtain the travel permit mandated in the May 19 diplomatic note to facilitate their in-country travel. 11. (C) On July 9, Post formally advised the MFA via diplomatic note that the Public Affairs Officer, CDA and their son would travel on July 20 to the Graeco-Roman ruins at Cyrene (east of Benghazi) for tourism. The PAO also intended to meet with representatives of the Global Heritage Fund, who received a USG grant for archaeological work being done at the Cyrene site. Despite daily inquiries between July 14 and 20, the GOL failed to issue travel permits for PAO and CDA. Inquiries to airline officials suggested that Emboffs would not be allowed to board the flight to Benghazi without travel permits; the trip was therefore cancelled. TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS APPEAR TO TARGET U.S. DIPLOMATS 12. (C) In addition to instructions prohibiting Libyan air carriers from boarding U.S. diplomats for domestic flights from Tripoli, the May 19 diplomatic note requiring diplomats and their families to obtain permission for travel more than 70 km outside Tripoli appears to be targeted at western diplomats, particularly those from the U.S. The requirement for travel permits has been on the books for some time; however, it has not been consistently enforced. Diplomats at the embassies of Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Jordan, Chad and Sudan told Emboffs their missions did not receive the MFA's note requiring travel permits and are not required to notify the GOL in advance of in-country travel. Egyptian and Tunisian diplomats laughed off the suggestion that they would comply with the requirement, noting that if the GOL tried to enforce it against them, their governments would immediately reciprocate with similar strictures on Libyan diplomats accredited to Cairo and Tunis. European diplomats report that while certain EU embassies provide the GOL with advance notice of their travel (the U.K., for instance), there are no known instances in which the GOL has restricted a European diplomat or their family from traveling outside Tripoli. Several eastern European missions that received the May 19 note told us they have no intention of complying with the requirement; personnel from those missions have subsequently traveled without incident (and without permits) to Benghazi, Sabha and Ghadames. 13. (C) Comment: Despite comments by senior GOL officials attesting to the desire for broader and deeper ties, significant elements of the regime, particularly within the security apparatus, remain deeply skeptical of U.S.-Libya bilateral re-engagement in general, and of Emboffs' travel and outreach in particular. The GOL maintains an expansive definition of "unacceptable interference" in its domestic affairs; security organizations regard any effort to engage with Libyans and to report on domestic issues as dangerously subversive, reflecting the regime's overweaning focus on pre-empting any potential challenge to its authority. While perceptions of foreign interference are known to be a particularly neuralgic issue for the GOL (witness the March 2006 attack on the Italian consulate in Benghazi and the December 2007 arrest of a Lukoil executive on charges of industrial espionage), GOL officials appear to harbor particular concerns about U.S. diplomats. Blunt demarches by senior GOL officials (refs D, E) have underscored TRIPOLI 00000588 004 OF 004 the GOL's concern. Recent actions by the GOL to limit our activities nonetheless go well beyond the pale, particularly since they appear to have specifically targeted U.S. diplomats. We now have five instances of proposed in-country travel by Emboffs (involving five different officers and four different putative destinations) since March that the GOL has effectively blocked. Given that the regime's other recent counter-productive measures on the bilateral front appear to have been authored at the highest levels (refs A, D and F), engagement by senior officials in Washington with their GOL interlocutors will likely be necessary to mitigate the current constraints on Post's ability to conduct in-country travel and engagement with Libyans. End comment. GODFREY 2008-07-21 2011-02-01 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI666 LIBYAN REACTION TO CLAIMS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT POSITIVE, 2008-08-25 2011-02-01 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI679 SAIF AL-ISLAM AL-QADHAFI CALLS FOR FURTHER REFORM, THREATENS TO WITHDRAW FROM POLITICS REF: A) TRIPOLI 666, B) 07 TRIPOLI 759, C) TRIPOLI 227 TRIPOLI 00000679 001.2 OF 005 CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, Dept of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 1. (C) Summary: In a lengthy, much-anticipated speech at an annual youth forum gathering, Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, son of Muammar al-Qadhafi, implicitly criticized past decisions of his father's regime, called for dramatic changes to Libya's system of governance, claimed that much of his program of social, political and economic reform had been achieved, and said he intended to withdraw from politics to focus instead on civil society and development work. Conceding that Libya had suffered from "stagnation" during the sanctions period, he focused on the government's ambitious development program. The decentralized Jamahiriya system instituted by his father was confusing and had not delivered results, and Libya needed a constitution to underpin a more transparent government structure and more predictable decisionmaking processes. Drawing a line between proposed government restructuring and greater participation by Libyans in their own governance, he called for a more robust civil society, judicial reform, greater respect for human rights, and more press freedoms. Describing Muammar al-Qadhafi as a historically unique figure whose powers and prerogatives could not be inherited, he criticized Arab regimes in which sons succeed their fathers and flatly rejected the idea that he would automatically assume a position of leadership by dint of being his father's son. In the most controversial portion of his remarks, Saif al-Islam claimed that the major foreign policy issues and reform agenda items had been resolved, and that he intended to withdraw from politics. Expected to be a speech in which he previewed his father's upcoming Revolution Day address and clarified reform efforts and perhaps his own role within the government, Saif al-Islam's speech has instead confused Libyans and raised more questions than it answered. There have already been a series of highly-publicized meetings and press articles calling for him to "return" to politics, suggesting that his announced intention to "disappear for awhile" may have been a ploy to engender statements of popular support, possibly to help buttress him against critcism from conservative regime elements unhappy with his reform agenda. Regardless of his intent, the speech has raised doubts about the long-term viability of the reform agenda and called into question whether Saif al-Islam is ready for a formal leadership role. End summary. LIBYA'S FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES HAVE BEEN RESOLVED ... 2. (C) At at the third annual Libya Youth Forum near the southern city of Sabha on August 20, Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi framed his remarks by saying that Libyan had resolved its major foreign policy issues and no longer faced external threats. (Note: The head of the Federal Express franchise in Libya, who bid on a contract to deliver equipment and supplies to the venue, said the remote site had been selected largely to facilitate better crowd control and security. Demonstrations, which were violently suppressed, broke out at last year's Youth Forum gathering in Benghazi, prompting state media to cut the television feed. End note.) Speaking at a desert venue by the Oubari Lakes, Saif al-Islam referred to the U.S.-Libya comprehensive claims settlement agreement signed by NEA A/S Welch in Tripoli on August 14 (ref A) and noted that embargoes and sanctions were now a thing of the past. The U.S. and other states were now contemplating selling arms to Libya, which had been "just a dream" a few short months ago. Saif's reference to the U.S.-Libya claims agreement drew loud, sustained applause from the crowd of young Libyans. In an implicit criticism of Libya's past foreign policy adventures, Saif al-Islam said that many of Libya's issues with the West had been "unnecessary battles in the first place". ... LEAVING IT TO FOCUS ON REMEDYING INTERNAL "STAGNATION" 3. (SBU) Saying Libya had been "in stagnation for decades" because of international sanctions, Saif al-Islam conceded that Libya was "also at fault" for its period of isolation. He cautioned that while there were many reasons for Libya's past foreign policy decisions, "now is not the time to talk about that". He instead focused on Libya's ambitious program of infrastructure development, much of which is designed to demonstrate tangible benefits of the Fatah Revolution in the run-up to the upcoming 40th anniversary of the September 1, 1969 coup that brought Muammar al-Qadhafi to power. Conceding that infrastructure, housing and development had been neglected for too long, he also tacitly conceded that the current sudden spending spree had occasioned its own problems, saying that the rush to disburse 130 billion Libyan dinar (about USD 108 billion) worth of infrastructure contracts in the past year had led to "confusion and hysteria". In a nod to two key popular TRIPOLI 00000679 002.2 OF 005 concerns, he specifically mentioned large investments in education and health care, claiming that foreign universities and foreign hospitals were being established in Libya. JAMAHIRIYA SYSTEM HASN'T DELIVERED; NEW GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE & CONSTITUTION NEEDED 4. (SBU) Turning to governance, Saif al-Islam resurrected his call for a constitution, something he explicitly advocated in his 2006 Youth Forum speech in Sirte, which drew harsh criticism at the time from the Revolutionary Committees and other conservative regime elements. Reacting to that, Saif al-Islam had softened his language in his 2007 speech in Benghazi (ref B), using the term "social contract". In Sabha this year, he adopted slightly more forward leaning language, saying Libya "needs something, which is perhaps called a constitution - let's say a popular pact similar to the social pact or a pact of the mass of the people". Such a contract should stem from the popular authority of the people, he said, but stressed that a formal document of some kind was needed to enshrine and protect the will of the people against unconstitutional attempts to usurp power as in the recent coup in Mauritania. 5. (SBU) Criticizing the inchoate nature of the decentralized Jamahiriya system, he said Libyans are frustrated with the the existing system's failure to deliver basic services such as trash collection, pest control, water and electricity, and now want a clearly articulated system of rules that govern personal conduct, economic affairs and governance. Describing the bedrock of good governance as effective local government, he stressed that despite the rhetoric about popular local committees, the Jamahiriya system of his father had not delivered on that front. Describing the decision to dismantle formal decisionmaking structures and to effectively decouple the local and central governments as "a mistake", he called for a "new administrative structure" that would better integrate local municipalities and districts with the central government. 6. (SBU) Referring to Muammar al-Qadhafi's March 2 address to the General People's Congress, in which he called for government restructuring and radical privatization (ref C), Saif al-Islam conceded that he had been personally involved in the work of the committees tasked with implementing his father's vision. He emphasized that plans for restructuring the government are underway, and will involve reshaped local institutions and greater privatization. Arguing for aggressive privatization, he said "the state will not own anything" and "everything should be done by the private sector". (Note: As reported ref C, five committees were established to formulate plans for implementing Muammar al-Qadhafi's March 2 vision. Contacts have told us Saif al-Islam established shadow committees staffed by personnel from the Economic Development Board (EDB) and National Planning Council (NPC); the final recommendations for implementing al-Qadhafi's vision reflected heavy input from the shadow committees. End note.) Referring obliquely to reports of fierce infighting over recommendations about restructuring and privatization, Saif al-Islam noted that "many things that were not nice" had happened in the course of recent intra-government debates, but stressed that those issues had been resolved. CIVIL SOCIETY, JUDICIAL REFORM, HUMAN RIGHTS & PRESS FREEDOMS NECESSARY 7. (SBU) Drawing a line between proposed government restructuring and greater direct participation by Libyans in their own governance, Saif al-Islam explicitly called for a more robust civil society, judicial reform, greater respect for human rights, and more press freedoms. Stressing that the best guarantee of "democracy, liberty and human rights" was "a strong, independent, enduring civil society" akin to that in the U.S., he argued that Libya urgently needs a more robust civil society if it is to develop further. Noting his personal involvement in sending an estimated 12,000 Libyan students abroad to Europe, Australia and the U.S. to study, he predicted that great strides would be made when those students returned to work in Libya, and called on Libyan youth to establish civic associations to help ensure government accountability. 8. (SBU) Citing corrupt judicial systems in the former Soviet Union and elsewhere in the Middle East, Saif al-Islam called for a fair judicial system and rule of law, without which "all the things (reforms) that we do will be undermined ... and disappear". In a swipe at Muammar al-Qadhafi's famously TRIPOLI 00000679 003.2 OF 005 mercurial style of leadership, Saif al-Islam linked human rights progress to a stable, clearly articulated political and judicial system, noting that "we want to have an administrative, legal and constitutional system once and for all, rather than change ... every year". In a line that drew sustained applause and wide press coverage, he noted that a new draft legal code was currently being reviewed by the government and said " ... the count-down towards building a state of institutions, constitutions, rule of law, and modern management has started with a set of new laws which is being presented to the people everywhere, incuding the new administrative structure of the country". 9. (SBU) The new legal code, he argued, was critical if Libya was to enshrine essential civil society concepts such as expanded respect for human rights and press freedoms. Conceding that "anybody could have violated your rights" in Libya before, he claimed those days were over. Softening his criticism of past abuses, he said Libya had not been in a position to simultaneously address development and human rights needs. With progress on the development front, respect for human rights was now necessary, in part to help sustain development efforts: "Libyans cannot build the Libya of tomorrow when they are scared and frightened of internal, external security apparatuses, the police and so on". (Note: The Qadhafi Development Foundation, headed by Saif al-Islam, announced an initiative the week before his speech to compensate families of prisoners killed during the government's suppression of a riot at the notorious Abu Salim Prison in 1995. End note.) He called for greater press freedom as a means to help ensure government accountabilitym noting that a more independent press would reveal "where the secret deals are taking place, where the problems lie, and where the conspiracies are being planned". NO ONE CAN INHERIT MUAMMAR AL-QADHAFI'S POWERS & PREROGATIVES 10. (SBU) Criticizing the "forest of dictatorships" in the Middle East, he said modern Arab regimes were characterized by hereditary, dictatorial executives, "fanciful, ineffective parliaments" and human rights violations. Disparaging Arab governance, he complimented the state of Israel, in which a president could be forced from office on sexual harassment charges, and a prime minister on corruption charges. Reprising nomenclature he used in his 2007 Youth Forum address in Benghazi (ref B), Saif al-Islam nonetheless described Muammar al-Qadhafi's role as a "redline" that was beyond criticism and not subject to other government restructuring efforts. Likening his father's position in modern Libya to that of George Washington, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and the Ayatollah Khomeini, he stressed that Muammar al-Qadhafi's role was historically unique and that neither he nor anyone else was entitled to inherit that mantle. He flatly rejected the proposition that he would automatically assume the position and prerogatives of his father by dint of blood relation. "This is not a private farm to be inherited", he said. For Libya to experience hereditary succession would put the country "at square one again" in terms of political development. SAIF SAYS HE'LL WITHDRAW FROM POLITICS ... 11. (SBU) In the most publicized and controversial part of his address, Saif al-Islam said he would recuse himself from politics and instead focus on civil society and development work. Claiming that "the time of major battles has ended" - he referred to the U.S. claims agreement and foreign policy contretemps such as the Lockerbie bombing and the Bulgarian medics case - Saif al-Islam said "I have no more major battles and my position has become embarrassing". Justifying his prominent role in sensitive affairs of state, he admitted freely that he had intervened extensively in foreign affairs, government restructuring and development " ... because there were " ... no presently-functioning institutions and no administrative system (in Libya) which were capable of doing these jobs". Claiming that much of his program of resolving key foreign policy challenges, initiating government restructuring and development, and human rights reforms had been accomplished and that the rest was "on track", he said his central role was no longer needed or appropriate. Referring to George Orwell's novel "The Animal Farm" as a cautionary tale against the danger of would-be revolutionary leaders recapitulating the errors of the systems they had overthrown, he cautioned that it would be problematic if he were to continue his involvement in political issues. Noting that some regime elements "hated" his reform efforts, he stressed that Libya's future lies with clearly TRIPOLI 00000679 004.2 OF 005 organized institutions and a robust civil society, rather than charismatic personalities. Addressing his future, Saif al-Islam claimed he would withdraw from affairs of state, perhaps "disappear for awhile" and focus on civil society and development efforts. Discounting the possibility that he would be lured back into politics, he stressed that he did not intend to return and said he would rightly be considered "a liar" if he did. .. BUT THE MASSES SAY HE MUST "CONTINUE HIS REVOLUTIONARY JOURNEY" 12. (SBU) Reaction to Saif al-Islam's stated intention to withdraw from politics has been swift and well-coordinated. In a series of meetings held on August 24 at the People's Hall in Tripoli, members of the Revolutionary Committees, various youth organizations, professional associations, and local government committees issued strongly worded calls for Saif al-Islam to "return" to politics. The crowd at the People's Hall frequently broke into chants of "Keep up the journey, oh son of the brave man!" The dean of the lawyers' association, Bashir al-Tawir, said Saif al-Islam was "a revolutionary man who should continue his revolutionary journey". Striking a populist note, Muhammad Aribi, the People's Leadership Coordinator in Tripoli, claimed that "only America and Zionism" would benefit from Saif al-Islam's withdrawal from politics. Similar calls were issued at gatherings of youth organizations around the country that began the day after his speech, and a larger youth event - designed to lure Saif al-Islam back - is scheduled to take place in Benghazi shortly before Muammar al-Qadhafi's Revolution Day speech on September 1. The leadership of the national youth organization and Saif al-Islam's Libya al-Ghad (Libya of Tomorrow) organization reportedly threatened to resign en masse unless he continued in his political role. Unusually, the proceedings at the People's Hall were not covered by state radio or television, but were heavily covered by the Libya Fada'iya satellite channel and Ouea newspaper, both owned by Saif al-Islams 1/09 media group. COMMENT 13. (C) Saif al-Islam's Youth Day speeches are closely followed as a barometer of reform efforts and a harbinger of policy initiatives. Embassy contacts, who expected Saif al-Islam's remarks to clarify expectations about Muammar al-Qadhafi's Revolution Day speech early next week, were instead left confused about the state of the reform agenda and government restructuring, as well as Saif's own political future. Several noted that Saif al-Islam did himself a disservice by clearly departing from his prepared remarks in an attempt at a more improvised delivery. The halting, rambling speech exacerbated the perception that the typically charismatic Saif al-Islam was nervous. Key advisers Omran Bukhres and Dr. Yusuf Sawani were reportedly "beside themselves" that he had departed from the carefully crafted text they helped prepare. Several contacts also noted that there were junctures at which Saif al-Islam appeared to be restraining himself from going further in his remarks, particularly with respect to intra-governmental squabbling about restructuring and rumors that he was hated by conservative regime elements. 14. (C) Few take seriously Saif al-Islam's claim that he intends to withdraw from politics entirely, but there is confusion about what he intended to achieve by threatening to do so. The swift calls for him to "return" suggest a scripted plot to garner political credibility for him as a genuinely populist figure, possibly as a prelude to announcement of a more formal role for him during the upcoming Revolution Day speech. There have been reports on websites that the government restructuring could include a Social Leadership Council, to be headed by a senior figure. Some observers have speculated that his remarks on hereditary Arab regimes and Muammar al-Qadhafi's historically unique role were intended as a subtle warning to his own siblings, some of whom have recently become more naked in their ambitions. A contact with regular access to the family believes that Saif al-Islam intended to signal to his father dissatisfaction that he, Saif, has undertaken the most sensitive, labor-intensive work in the government without benefit of formal position, by contrast with his brother, Muatassim, who was named National Security Adviser last year. 15. (C) Saif al-Islam's claim that work on human rights, personal liberties and development was in "its last round" is broadly seen to be premature. The consensus among Libyans is TRIPOLI 00000679 005.2 OF 005 that while Saif al-Islam has helped contribute to the beginnings of reform in some areas, much remains to be done. A line of thinking we've heard from some of our savvier contacts is that references to accomplishments and intra-government bickering were a tacit admission that he had not yet achieved all he hoped to, in part because of resistance from truculent conservative regime elements. The corollary to that interpretation is that he is still needed to keep those efforts in train. His remarks about closing the books on past mistakes have been interpreted by a number of contacts as a subtle signal to the Revolutionary Committees and other old guard regime elements that he is willing to put aside old grievances. The commonly-held view is that while Libya has made some strides in the right direction since Saif al-Islam's coming out party in 2003, when he previewed a reformist agenda in his first major public address, the gains that have been made to date are modest and not likely to endure absent the active advocacy and protection of a politically well-connected patron. Whether he was sincere in stating his intent to withdraw from politics or meant it as a coy means by which to engender popular support, the effect of Saif al-Islam's speech has been to raise doubts about the long-term viability of the reform agenda (if he in fact exits the scene) and to call into question whether he is really ready for a formal leadership role (if this is all part of an elaborate act of kabuki theater). All eyes are now on Muammar al-Qadhafi and his Revolution Day address on or about September 1. End comment. STEVENS 2008-08-28 2011-02-01 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI680 SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY RICE’S VISIT TO 2008-08-29 2011-02-01 SECRET Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI685 LIBYA: MEETING WITH RETURNED GTMO DETAINEES UNDER USG-GOL TRANSFER FRAMEWORK MOU REF: A) NARDI-GODFREY/POMPER EMAIL 08/22/2008, B) WILLIAMS-STEVENS EMAIL 08/ 23/2008, C) TRIPOLI 455, D) GODFREY-NARDI/POMPER EMAIL 08/22/2008, E) 07 TR IPOLI 723 CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, Dept of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (c), (d) 1. (S/NF) Summary: Post visited two returned Guantanamo detainees to confirm their welfare and whereabouts and clarify the status of any pending legal action against them. One detainee's trial has reportedly been completed and he understands he has been sentenced to 25 years imprisonment. The trial of the second detainee has begun and several hearings have been held; the next is scheduled for September 3. End summary. 2. (S/NF) Per refs A and B, P/E Chief interviewed separately returned Guantanamo detainees Muhammad Abdallah Mansur al-Rimi (AKA Abdul Salam Abdul Omar Sufrani, ISN 194) and Ben Qumu Abu Sufian Ibrahim Ahmed Hamouda (ISN 557) on September 1. The meeting took place at a GOL security service facility in Tripoli. A host government security official facilitated the meeting; however, no host government officials participated in the meetings with the two returned detainees. The last visit to the two returned detainees took place on June 10, 2008 (ref C). ISN 194 3. (S/NF) Al-Rimi (ISN 194), who was returned to Libya in December 2006, said he remains in detention at the Abu Salim prison, located in the Tripoli suburbs. (Note: Al-Rimi had been detained at an External Security Organization (ESO) detention facility between his return to Libya in December 2006 and June 2007, when he was transferred to Abu Salim. End note.) Al-Rimi said he continues to be held alone in his cell, but he is able to exercise at least once a week for about an hour at a time. He indicated he is able to leave his cell and interact with other prisoners. He is provided with drinking water, tea and three meals a day. He does not have access to books, radio or television. He has access to medications and has been visited by a prison doctor on the occasions when he has been ill. Al-Rimi stated that he had received one family visit - his sisters came to see him in July - since our last meeting with him on June 10. (Note: Our understanding is that members of his family have visited him on four occasions since his return to Libya - January 2007, May 2007 (ref D), March 2008 and July 2008. End note.) Al-Rimi said he would like to receive more family visits, if possible. 4. (S/NF) Asked about the condition of his arm and his teeth, about which he had previously complained (ref E), al-Rimi said both were fine. He noted that he needed dental care for another tooth, which had developed problems after his return to Libya. A dentist recently visited him at Abu Salim prison and told al-Rimi the tooth (a back tooth on the upper row in which al-Rimi has recently experienced pain) should be extracted. Al-Rimi said he instead requested that it be "cleaned and repaired", but the dentist said the tooth was not salvageable. According to al-Rimi, the dentist is to visit him again soon to discuss how to proceed. 5. (S/NF) In our previous meeting on June 10, al-Rimi said he understood his case was being deliberated at that time by a panel of judges, who were to render a verdict and issue a sentence on/about June 16. Al-Rimi said he was not present when his verdict and sentence were issued, but heard from other prisoners who were present in the courtroom on June 16 in connection with their own cases that he was found guilty of some charges (NFI) and sentenced to 25 years imprisonment. (Note: Per ref C, al-Rimi's understanding was that he faced four charges: 1) membership in the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group; 2) membership in al-Qaeda; 3) forging a passport and travel documents and using them to exit the country, and; 4) failing to secure permission to exit the country when he left to fight in Afghanistan. It is not clear which of those he was convicted of. End note.) Al-Rimi has received no information from Libyan officials about his trial, verdict or sentence. He met with his court-appointed legal counsel on one occasion about two months before his reported conviction and sentencing on June 16, and has not heard from him since. ISN 557 6. (S/NF) Hamouda (ISN 557), who was returned to Libya in August 2007, said he remains in detention at the Abu Salim prison, located in the Tripoli suburbs. (Note: He was detained at an ESO detention facility for about three months after his return and was then transferred to the Abu Salim prison. End note.) He remains in solitary detention, his biggest complaint. He is able to speak through the walls with prisoners in adjacent cells, but is not able to leave his cell and interact with other prisoners and is not able to exercise. Hamouda wants to be able TRIPOLI 00000685 002 OF 002 to leave his cell. (Note: During our previous meeting on June 10, the security official who facilitated the meeting explained that detention protocols for extremists and terrorists mandate that they be held in solitary detention to preclude the possibility that they could recruit other members of the prison population. End note.) Hamouda complained about the lack of sunlight and fresh air. He is provided with drinking water, tea and three meals a day. He does not have access to books, radio or television. He requested that he be provided with pens, paper and books. Hamouda said he not received a family visit since our last meeting with him on June 10, but conceded that he was unsure whether they had tried to do so. (Note: Our understanding is that Hamouda has had two visits by members of his family since his return: his wife and children visited in late December, and his wife and brother-in-law saw him in January. End note.) 7. (S/NF) Hamouda has access to medications and was visited by a prison doctor in March/April, who responded to his complaints of depression and anxiety by prescribing him anti-depressant medication that left him "groggy and tired". He also received a prescription at that time from the Libyan doctor for an indeterminate condition for which he said he had been treated at Guantanamo Bay. He complained that the medication prescribed by the Libyan doctor for the condition was ineffective and asked for Laproxin, which was prescribed for him at Guantanamo Bay and had been effective; however, he has been told that Laproxin is not available in Libya. (Note: Per ref C, Hamouda said on June 10 that he may be seen by a prison doctor if he is ill, but that he had not needed to so since his return. He had no answer when he was asked to explain the contradictory accounts. End note.) 8. (S/NF) Hamouda said his trial had begun and that there had been three hearings to date, which he attended, at a court facility in the Abu Salim prison. His next hearing is scheduled for September 3; it is unclear whether the court will render a verdict at that hearing. He has court-appointed legal counsel, but has not met his lawyer outside of courtroom hearings. His understanding is that he faces three charges: 1) membership in the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group; 2) membership in al-Qaeda, and; 3) that he performed illicit work for a private company in Sudan and Afghanistan. He also faces charges related to a drug trafficking offense for which he was convicted and imprisoned in the early 1990's. He complained that the charges against him are based entirely on hearsay from witnesses whose credibility is suspect, and maintained that he was innocent. 9. (S/NF) Facilitation of access to the detainees under the revised rubric detailed in ref D was quick and straightforward. Post submitted a diplomatic note on August 24 formally requesting access to the detainees and, despite the beginning of Ramadan and Libya's national day celebrations in the intervening period, access was granted on September 1 (i.e., within a week of the request). 10. (S/NF) Despite several requests for information about the legal basis on which the two returned detainees are being held and the status/schedule of any legal proceedings against them, Post has received no response from the GOL to date. The only information we have is from the two detainees. We pressed the GOL to provide information about the detainees' legal status and the state of play in the legal proceedings against them, stressing that we needed to receive such information directly from the GOL. To date, however, we have not received the requested information from the GOL. STEVENS 2008-09-02 2011-02-01 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI819 SELF-DESCRIBED REGIME CRITIC IDRISS BOUFAYED RELEASED 2008-10-14 2011-02-01 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI851 LIBYAN-SWISS CONTRETEMPS DRAGS ON 2008-10-27 2011-02-01 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI882 UPDATE ON RELEASED REGIME CRITIC DR. IDRISS BOUFAYED AND PLANNED MEDICAL TRAVEL REF: A) NARDI-GODFREY EMAIL 10/27/2008, B) TRIPOLI 472, C) TRIPOLI 819, D) TRIPOLI 851 CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, U.S. Dept of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 1. (C) Summary: The Qadhafi Development Foundation (QDF) has reportedly obtained a passport and is finalizing travel permission for self-described regime critic Dr. Idriss Boufayed, who was recently released on humanitarian grounds from a 25 year prison term in light of his advanced lung cancer. The QDF will coordinate and pay for Boufayed's travel, and will facilitate (and possibly also underwrite) medical treatment abroad. The QDF is anxious that Boufayed travel quickly - perhaps in part out of concern that delays in granting his humanitarian release contributed to the seriousness of his medical condition - and is waiting for a decision from him on where he wishes to go for medical treatment and when. Boufayed is reportedly feeling better and is receiving visitors and paying social calls to neighbors. Reports that the QDF helped Boufayed obtain a passport and stands ready to facilitate his travel abroad for medical treatment represent a welcome development; however, we've been here before with respect to the QDF claiming positive intervention that later proved to be untrue, particularly in the case of detained human rights activist Fathi al-Jahmi. End summary. 2. (C) Pef ref A, P/E Chief met with xxxxxxxxxxxx(strictly protect) on November 10 to follow up on the case of self-described regime critic Dr. Idriss Boufayed, who was sentenced to 25 years of imprisonment earlier this year in connection with planning a peaceful demonstration (ref B). Boufayed was released on humanitarian grounds on October 8 from the Sabratha Hospital, where he was undergoing treatment for advanced lung cancer (ref C), and returned to his family home in Gharyan. 3. (C) xxxxxxxxxxxx visited Gharyan on November 6 and met with Idriss Boufayed's brother, Juma'a Boufayed. (Note: Juma'a Boufayed himself was arrested in February 2007, shortly after his brother and eleven other individuals were arrested on the eve of a planned peaceful demonstration in Tripoli's Green Square. As reported ref B, Juma'a Boufayed was released on/about May 27, shortly before a state security court convicted his brother and 10 others of planning to overthrow the government and conducting unauthorized meetings with representatives of a foreign government. End note.) xxxxxxxxxxxx said the Qadhafi Development Foundation (QDF), which had helped facilitate Idriss Boufayed's release on humanitarian grounds, had secured a passport for Boufayed (who is not yet in possession of it) and was in the process of obtaining permission from Libyan security organizations for him to travel abroad for medical treatment. xxxxxxxxxxxx did not anticipate problems with respect to exit permissions; Boufayed's name was removed from airport and land border crossing watchlists when he was granted humanitarian release. The QDF will coordinate entry visas for the (presumably European) country in which Boufayed decides to seek treatment, and will also facilitate travel arrangements and medical appointments. Tarnish said the QDF was still discussing whether to pay for Boufayed's medical treatment (it has already agreed to defray his travel expenses), and said he thought it would. 4. (C) Noting that the QDF's Human Rights Committee Director, Saleh Abdulsalam Saleh, was personally involved in the case, Tarnish said the QDF was anxious that Boufayed travel quickly and was only waiting for a decision from him as to where he wanted to travel for medical treatment and when. (Comment: Boufayed's medical condition is reportedly grave and we've heard reports that the GOL would prefer that he not die in Libya to minimize potential public discontent. The QDF may be anxious to expedite his travel to mitigate charges that the GOL's failure to grant humanitarian release earlier contributed to his decline. End comment.) Addressing rumors that Boufayed might be discouraged from traveling to Switzerland (where he resided for a number of years) in light of ongoing Libyan-Swiss contretemps (ref D) , xxxxxxxxxxxx said the QDF would do all it could if that was where Boufayed decided he wanted to go. 5. (C) Citing Juma'a Boufayed, xxxxxxxxxxxx said Idriss Boufayed's medical condition and mental health had improved since his release. Visits to him were initially limited after his return home because his health was fragile and his family did not want large numbers of visitors in their home; however, Boufayed is currently able to receive visitors at will and has begun paying TRIPOLI 00000882 002 OF 002 social visits to neighbors' homes as well. xxxxxxxxxxxx said a number of regime critics, journalists and members of Libya's nascent civil society have quietly made the trip to Gharyan in recent weeks to see him. xxxxxxxxxxxx is scheduled to visit Boufayed next week and will give us a readout. xxxxxxxxxxxx has not received a response to the petition it submitted in October to the QDF asking that it urge the GOL to release the other 10 individuals convicted in the Boufayed case, who remain in prison. Separately, U.K. Poloff David Clay told us on November 9 that not all EU capitals had weighed in yet on whether to agree to a joint demarche to the GOL requesting access to Jamal al-Hajj, a Danish-Libyan dual citizen who was among the individuals arrested with Boufayed. 6. (C) Comment: The news that the QDF has helped Boufayed obtain a passport and stands ready to facilitate and perhaps underwrite his travel abroad for medical treatment is a welcome development; however, we've been here before with respect to the QDF claiming positive intervention that later proved to be untrue, particularly in the case of detained human rights activist Fathi al-Jahmi. xxxxxxxxxxxx's planned visit to Idriss Boufayed next week should afford another point of reference from which to gauge the likelihood that medical travel will in fact be facilitated. End comment. STEVENS 2008-11-13 2011-02-01 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI889 TRIBAL VIOLENCE IN KUFRA 2008-11-16 2011-02-01 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI895 LIBYA: INTERIM TIP ASSESSMENT 2008-11-17 2011-02-01 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI919 NEA/MAG DIRECTOR DISCUSSES HUMAN RIGHTS AND LIFG NEGOTIATIONS WITH QADHAFI DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION REF: A) TRIPOLI 819, B) TRIPOLI 472, C) TRIPOLI 280, D) TRIPOLI 577 2008-11-26 2011-02-01 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI921 LIBYA SEEKS TO DOWNPLAY TRIBAL VIOLENCE IN KUFRA 2008-11-30 2011-02-01 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI923 GOL SEEKS TO TURN THE PAGE ON LINGERING HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES 2008-12-01 2011-02-01 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI925 RELEASED REGIME CRITIC IDRISS BOUFAYED TO TRAVEL TO SWITZERLAND FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT REF: A) TRIPOLI 472, B) TRIPOLI 819, C) NEA/MAG OI 12/01/2008 2008-12-02 2011-02-01 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI926 SWISS FOREIGN MINISTER MAY VISIT TRIPOLI IN "LAST GASP" 2008-12-02 2011-02-01 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI936 MUAMMAR AL-QADHAFI QUIETLY INVOLVED IN PROCESS TO ADOPT A LIBYAN CONSTITUTION REF: A) 07 TRIPOLI 759, B) TRIPOLI 679 TRIPOLI 00000936 001.2 OF 003 2008-12-05 2011-02-01 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI943 DEVELOPMENTS IN EL-JAHMI AND BOUFAYED HUMAN RIGHTS CASES 2008-12-12 2011-02-01 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI960 QADHAFI DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION FACILITATES VISIT TO DETAINED HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST FATHI EL-JAHMI 2008-12-15 2011-02-01 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI969 REGIME CRITIC IDRISS BOUFAYED IN SWITZERLAND FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT REF: A) TRIPOLI 960, B) TRIPOLI 472, C) TRIPOLI 819 2008-12-18 2011-02-01 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI982 LIBYA: SECTION 565 WAIVER OF PROHIBITION AGAINST CONTRACTING WITH FIRMS COMPLYING WITH AL BOYCOTT 2008-12-29 2011-02-01 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI991 READOUT OF U.S.-UK-LIBYA TSCC BIO SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING, NOVEMBER 24-26 REF: 06 TRIPOLI 498 CLASSIFIED BY: John T. Godfrey, Acting DCM, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, U.S. Dept of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 2008-12-31 2011-02-01 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI993 QADHAFI DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION RESUMES DIALOGUE ON RELEASE 2008-12-31 2011-02-01 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI14 AMBASSADOR PRESENTS CREDENTIALS 2009-01-11 2011-02-01 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI17 AL-QADHAFI SUGGESTS LIBYAN ELECTIONS MAY BE IN THE OFFING 2009-01-12 2011-02-01 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI22 REGIME-ORCHESTRATED ATTACKS AGAINST BERBERS IN YEFREN 2009-01-13 2011-02-01 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI31 SENIOR REGIME FIGURES AMBIVALENT ABOUT U.S.-LIBYA RELATIONS 2009-01-15 2011-02-01 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tripoli
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