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Reference ID Subject Created Released Classification Origin
07TASHKENT2063 WMD PORTAL DETECTION IN UZBEKISTAN 2007-12-03 2011-02-01 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Tashkent
07TASHKENT2081 UPDATE ON WMD PORTAL DETECTION IN UZBEKISTAN REF: A. STATE 163194 B. TASHKENT 2063 Classified By: DTRA Fred Carter and Poloff Steven Prohaska for reasons 1.4 (b, d). 2007-12-05 2011-02-01 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Tashkent
07TASHKENT2171 WMD PORTAL DETECTION UPDATE: LEGAL RESTRICTIONS ON OPENING THE RAIL CAR REF: A. STATE 163194 B. TASHKENT 2063 C. TASHKENT 2081 D. TASHKENT 2090 Classified By: DTRO Chief Fred Carter and Poloff Steven Prohaska for re asons 1.4 (b, d). 2007-12-27 2011-02-01 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Tashkent
08TASHKENT43 RADIATION DETECTION UPDATE: GOVERNMENT OF UZBEKISTAN PASSES QUESTION RESPONSES, COMMISSION'S FINDINGS REF: A. 07 STATE 163194 B. 07 TASHKENT 2063 C. 07 TASHKENT 2081 D. 07 TASHKENT 2090 E. TD-314/79205-07 Classified By: Poloff Steven Prohaska and DTRO Chief Fred Carter for re asons 1.4 (b, d). 2008-01-10 2011-02-01 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Tashkent
08KABUL266 NUCLEAR SMUGGLING INCIDENT/PORTAL DETECTION AT 2008-02-02 2011-02-01 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kabul
08KABUL297 UPDATE: NUCLEAR SMUGGLING INCIDENT AT KABUL, 2008-02-05 2011-02-01 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kabul
08KAMPALA266 NUCLEAR SMUGGLING INCIDENT/PORTAL DETECTION IN KAMPALA- FEBRUARY 12, 2008 REF: SECSTATE 162091 2008-02-12 2011-02-01 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Kampala
08TRIPOLI526 LIBYA SEEKS TO BLACKMAIL EUROPEAN MISSIONS FOR VISAS 2008-07-03 2011-02-01 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI564 NATIONAL OIL CORPORATION CHAIRMAN SHUKRI GHANEM MAY SEEK TO 2008-07-13 2011-02-01 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI584 LIBYAN FOREIGN BANK - PRIMED FOR EXPANSION REF: A) GODFREY-MCKEEHAN EMAIL 7/15/2008, B) TRIPOLI 214, C) TRIPOLI 230, D) TRIPOLI 126, E) TRIPOLI 199, F) TRIPOLI 227 CLASSIFIED BY: John T. Godfrey, CDA, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, Dept of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 1. (C) Summary: The Libyan Foreign Bank (LFB), Libya's longtime conduit for international trade, is pursuing a substantial program of expansion involving a ten-fold increase in its capitalization and creation of an onshore bank. Its chairman is aggressively seeking new investment opportunities in Africa and beyond, and is contemplating whether and how to get into the U.S. market. The LFB recently doubled its capitalization of Bahrain-based Alubaf Bank, of which it has a 95 percent share. Regarding much-anticipated GOL reform initiatives, the LFB's Chairman expects a reprise of past efforts that featured form over substance. End Summary. 2. (SBU) CDA and Econoff met with Dr. Mohammed Abdullah Bayt Almal, Chairman of the Libyan Foreign Bank (formerly known as the Libyan Arab Foreign Bank) on July 16 to discuss recent changes at the LFB and its plans for the future. Established in 1972 as an offshore bank, the LFG has been Libya's leading institution for transactions essential to the conduct of international trade (issuing letters of credit, providing currency exchange services, etc.). The LFB has historically been the only Libyan bank that handled foreign currency accounts; Bayt Almal confirmed that it still does not possess any Libyan dinar-denominated accounts. ALUBAF BANK 3. (C) CDA asked about press reports detailing recent initiatives made by Bahrain-based Alubaf Arab International Bank. Bayt Almal confirmed that a proposal to double Alubaf's capital to $100 million and to appoint Bayt Almal to the Board of Directors were approved by shareholders in a meeting on July 9. He offered that Alubaf Bank nearly collapsed after a significant number of Iraqi-owned accounts were closed in 2003, but said the bank had since rebounded. He confirmed that the LFB owns a 95% share of Alubaf's Bahrain branch and 100% of its branch in Tunisia (ref A). Libya's Central Bank owns 100% of LFB, and is therefore the ultimate owner of Alubaf. DIVERSIFIED & SEEKING A PRESENCE IN THE U.S. 4. (SBU) The LFB's foreign interests are diverse and growing. It currently has "participation" (i.e., interests) in thirty-seven foreign entities located in twenty countries, from Mexico to China. Most of its interests are focused in sub-Saharan Africa, including every country in the Maghreb except Morocco. Bayt Almal estimated the LFB's current capital at $1 billion, with assets in excess of $21 billion worldwide. We had heard and reported previously that all Libyan government and financial institutions had divested themselves of holdings and accounts in the U.S. in response to potential seizure of assets under Section 1083 of the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (the so-called Lautenberg Amendment. According to Bayt Almal, the LFB continues to hold U.S. dollar accounts and - despite efforts by the Libyan Investment Authority and other Libyan government entities to limit their exposure in the U.S. (ref B) - is actively exploring the possibility of establishing a "strategic partnership" with a major U.S. bank and investing in a U.S.-based bank. LAND HO: MOVING ONSHORE 5. (SBU) Bayt Almal said that the LFB planned to open an onshore bank in Libya soon, contingent on approval by its parent institution, the Central Bank (CB). A plan currently before CB Governor Farhat Ben Gdara calls for a ten-fold expansion of the LFB's capital, from $1 billion to $10 billion. Conceding that LFB had aimed high, Bayt Almal said he would be happy with $6-7 billion, and expected to get it. Part of the justification for expanded capitalization involves establishing an onshore entity, which would allow LFB to diversify the range of products it offers in the Libyan market. With the continuing reform of the Libyan banking system, to include the purchase of stakes in Libyan banks by foreign entities (refs C, D), the LFB wants to ensure that it will remain competitive. It intends to inaugurate risk management and asset management services, which would both be entirely new service lines for the bank. (Note: Risk management and asset management are areas CB Governor Ben Gdara told us are most in need of help. End note.) In anticipation of this step, the LFB has expanded its training TRIPOLI 00000584 002 OF 002 efforts, sending employees abroad for hands-on training at partner institutions in Europe (Britain, France, Belgium, and Germany) and the Middle East (Jordan and the UAE). Bayt Almal cited a dearth of trained employees as one of the biggest stumbling blocks to banking reform in Libya. AL-QADHAFI'S PROPOSED GOVERNMENT REFORMS - "FORM OVER SUBSTANCE" 6. (C) Responding to a question about expected privatization and government restructuring stemming from Muammar al-Qadhafi's dramatic speech to the General People's Congress on March 2 (refs E, F), Bayt Almal wearily noted that Libya had "been through this before". He referred to his own experience in 2000, when the Libyan Cabinet underwent wholesale changes, leaving only Bayt Almal (then the Finance Minister) and the Foreign Minister in a "Prime Minister-plus two" formulation. During that round of reform, other ministries were re-labeled as "Haya" (translated as "institution" or "entity"). Despite the semantics, the old structures were essentially left in place. Bayt Almal expected a similar outcome at the end of the current reform exercise. He predicted that foreign affairs, defense, finance and the security services would be left intact in their current guises as "sovereign ministries" that would report directly to the Prime Minister-equivalent, a formulation al-Qadhafi himself hinted at in his March 2 address. 7. (C) Biographical Note: Bayt Almal was born in Egypt in 1948 and spent his childhood in Benghazi, despite the fact that his family originally hails from Misurata. He spent 1970-1978 in U.S., where he obtained an MA in accounting (in Muncie, Indiana) and PhD (at the University of Kentucky in Lexington) in finance. He then returned to Libya, where taught accounting at Garyounis University in Benghazi before serving as Secretary of Finance (1992-2000) and Auditor General (2003-2005). Various sources report that he served a three-year prison sentence in 2000-2003 in connection with an embezzlement case in Benghazi (Emboffs were not able to corroborate this story during their office call). Bayt Almal was married in 1970 while in the U.S., and he has seven daughters (two of them AmCits by birth), all of whom currently reside in/around Misurata. End biographical note. GODFREY 2008-07-21 2011-02-01 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI595 A COMMERCIAL CAUTIONARY TALE: BECHTEL'S BID FOR SIRTE PORT PROJECT FALLS FLAT CLASSIFIED BY: John T. Godfrey, CDA, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, Dept of State. REASON: 1.4 (b) 1. (C) Summary: An unsuccessful year-long bid by U.S. firm Bechtel to build a commercial port in the Libyan city of Sirte has shed light on how decisions about large foreign investment projects in Libya are made. Bechtel's bid went through several evolutions, including signing a memorandum of understanding with the Prime Minister and a resolution by Libya's Cabinet-equivalent to give the company the contract. In the end, the contract evaporated after apparent late-innings intervention by senior regime figures. Despite a year's worth of effort, $1 million worth of expenses, numerous high-level visits, and formal decisions by the GOL to bless the contract, the company's efforts were ultimately unsuccessful, underscoring the fact that Libya's much-trumpeted bidding process is less than transparent, and that the GOL's formal structures do not have the final word on major foreign investment projects. The fact that an operator with Bechtel's savvy and deep pockets was ultimately unable to secure its contract serves as a cautionary tale for the many U.S. and western companies seeking to enter Libya's booming market. End summary. PROMISING BEGINNINGS ... 2. (C) U.S. engineering and consulting giant Bechtel has just declared as dead a year-long attempt to secure a $1 billion cost-plus contract to build a commercial port in the Libyan city of Sirte. Bechtel began its pursuit of the Sirte port contract in July 2007, when senior Bechtel representative Charles Redman (strictly protect), former U.S. Ambassador to Germany, arrived in Tripoli for discussions at the invitation of the Qadhafi Development Foundation (QDF), a quasi-governmental entity headed by Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, son of Muammar al-Qadhafi. During the initial visit, QDF representatives encouraged Bechtel to bid on several small infrastructure projects so the company could "prove itself". Redman made it clear that Bechtel wanted, but did not need, business in Libya and had a record that spoke for itself. Eventually, QDF representatives invited Bechtel to execute two projects: a new commercial port facility at Sirte and management of an industrial city adjacent to the Ras Lanuf oil facility. The QDF proposed that Bechtel partner with the Libyan Economic and Social Development Fund (ESDF) to execute the Sirte Port project. 3. (C) This initial burst of positive energy dissipated over the next six months. Bechtel slowly made progress on a contract for the Sirte port project, but its relationship with General People's Committee (GPC) for Transportation, its primary interlocutor on the deal (apart from the QDF), became increasingly difficult. This primarily manifested itself in a lack of responsiveness on facilitation of visas for Bechtel representatives, prompting Bechtel to seek support from other quarters of the Government of Libya (GOL) to facilitate travel by its negotiators and technical staff. In November 2007, then Deputy Foreign Minister Muhammed Siala remarked publicly during a visit to Washington that Bechtel would not secure the Sirte port contract if Secretary Rice failed to visit Libya by year's end. LEAD TO HIGH-PROFILE COMMITMENTS 4. (C) After months of go-slow negotiations, Bechtel experienced an apparent breakthrough in February, when Redman received an urgent call from Minister of Transportation Elmabruk, who asked that the company's team be in Sirte on February 25 to "sign the contract". Although the company was still in the midst of conducting a laborious due diligence review of the contract (key provisions of which had not been finalized), they were convinced to rush a delegation to Sirte in time for a signing event. At that event, Prime Minister al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi and Bechtel signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) committing the two sides to finalizing the contract as soon as possible. In addition, the General People's Committee (Cabinet-equivalent) issued Decision #158 on March 3, which was effectively an announcement of contract terms that granted permission to the GPC for Transportation to sign a contract with Bechtel. Following these public steps by the GOL, Bechtel reported that the GPC for Transportation appeared to be working in earnest to finalize an English-language version of the contract. RADIO SILENCE BROKEN BY BAD NEWS FROM SAIF AL-ISLAM'S INTERMEDIARY TRIPOLI 00000595 002 OF 002 5. (C) With expectations running high that a final deal was imminent, Bechtel pressed on with negotiations and a fully-vetted contract was presented to the Transportation Minister in early May. From that point on, all communication with the QDF, GPC for Transportation and Libyan Ports Authority (another key player in the deal) went dead. Sensing that something was amiss, Bechtel representatives continued to inquire about that status of the contract, but received no response. On July 14, Abdulhakim el-Ghami, described as "an intermediary for a person very close to Saif al-Islam", called Redman to inform him that the port project had been canceled. (Note: Redman told us el-Ghami, who is based in Munich, appears to be a key conduit for Saif al-Islam's dealings with foreign companies. End note.) Bechtel received no explanation as to why the contract was cancelled, but el-Ghami encouraged the company to "seriously consider" undertaking a different, unspecified infrastructure development project. 6. (C) Comment: Bechtel's experience throws into stark relief the fact that economic and commercial decisions ostensibly finalized by even the most senior levels of the GOL can be overturned by influential elements operating outside the formal government structure. Libyan officials have made much of recent measures designed to ensure transparency and predictability in bids for commercial contracts; however, the reality is that contracts of any size, particularly those involving foreign companies, are subject to intense maneuvering by regime insiders jockeying to ensure that they company they happen to champion wins the prize. Bechtel's story also reinforces post's understanding of Saif al-Islam's key as a principal gatekeeper for large foreign investment projects in Libya, a process he manages through the QDF and the National Engineering Services and Supply Company (NESSCO - further details will be reported septel). The silver lining in this tale of woe is that Bechtel's power division has been awarded a project management job for construction of a new power plant outside Sirte; however, the sorry denouement of the company's efforts to secure the Sirte port contract have dampened its for seeking any new major projects in Libya in the near future and should serve as a cautionary tale for other U.S. companies considering major investment projects here. . GODFREY 2008-07-23 2011-02-01 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI642 2008-08-12 2011-02-01 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI896 AL-QADHAFI AND THE REFORM "VISION THING" REF: A) TRIPOLI 227, B) TRIPOLI 842, C) TRIPOLI 699 TRIPOLI 00000896 001.2 OF 003 CLASSIFIED BY: John T. Godfrey, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, U.S. Dept of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 1. (C) Summary: In a meeting broadcast on state-owned television, senior Government of Libya (GOL) officials disagreed with Muammar al-Qadhafi about plans to implement dramatic government restructuring and privatization he proposed last March. Al-Qadhafi blasted the officials, accusing them of wanting to maintain the status quo to continue profiting from corruption, and insisted that plans to restructure the government and directly distribute shares of oil revenues to the Libyan people be implemented. International media have touted the show as a rare glimpse into the opaque Jamahiriya system; however, local observers believe the meeting was a staged piece of political theater designed to give public cover to an expected scaling back of the proposed reforms. Senior GOL officials have told us privately that serious risks (inflation, currency devaluation, etc.) posed by Leader's vision, together with a lack of consensus about how to implement it, mean the project will be delayed until at least the second quarter of 2009. The personal, albeit unpublicized, involvement of Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, son of Muammar al-Qadhafi, in implementing the initiative has thrown into stark relief disagreements between the regime's old guard and would-be reformers. More cynical contacts have speculated that al-Qadhafi's intent all along was to raise the specter of privatization and government restructuring to make the increasingly creaky Jamahiriya system seem favorable by comparison and temper calls for more sweeping change. End summary. GOL LEADERS DISPUTE REFORM PLAN 2. (SBU) In a development picked up by Reuters, AFP and the Financial Times, Libya's state-owned Jamahiriya News Agency (JANA) televised a meeting between Muammar al-Qadhafi and senior government officials on November 11 in which several GPC secretaries (minister-equivalents) openly disagreed with the Leader about plans to implement dramatic government restructuring and privatization he first proposed in an address to the General People's Congress in March (ref A). In the meeting, Central Bank Governor Farhat Bengadara warned that implementing plans to directly disburse monthly shares of Libya's oil revenues to the Libyan people would fuel undisciplined consumption (an idea al-Qadhafi specifically refuted in March), spark inflation, precipitate devaluation of the dinar, create a balance of payments deficit and cause a decline in real incomes. Minister of Economy and Trade Ali Essawi cautioned that the combination of direct cash payments and dismantling much of the government structure would not prompt greater production or investment, and would adversely impact long-term economic growth and social development. Instead of direct cash payments, Secretary of the General People's Committee (Prime Minister-equivalent) al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi advocated an ill-defined scheme to give Libyans shares in banks and companies through portfolios that would be managed by financial institutions. Pointing to the recent decline in oil prices, several senior GOL officials noted that plan would be more tenable with higher oil prices, but was too risky given the dramatic fluctuations recently seen. AL-QADHAFI (PUBLICLY) INSISTS ON GOING FORWARD 3. (SBU) Striking a populist note, al-Qadhafi blasted the officials, insisting that they wanted to maintain the status quo to keep their positions and continue profiting from corruption. (Note: Al-Qadhafi criticized PM al-Mahmoudi by name in his Revolution Day speech and accused him of being corrupt; his exchange with him in the televised meeting has reinforced widespread expectation that al-Mahmoudi will be sacked in connection with an expected Cabinet shuffle during the March 2009 General People's Congress. End note.) Reprising themes he touched on in March, he said that since multiple efforts to address corruption and mismanagement in the popular committees (ministry-equivalents) had failed, Libyans should instead receive a direct share of oil revenues from which to underwrite health care, education, utilities and investments. Responding to concerns about implementation of the reforms, he stressed that " ... the decision to distribute oil revenues, their sole source of wealth, directly to the people is not negotiable". He conceded that it was "bad luck" that the wealth distribution proposal coincided with declining oil prices, but stressed that the result of the regime's 40-year effort to manage Libya's resources on behalf of its people had been "very bad". He reiterated the argument made in March that once oil revenues were directly distributed, it would no longer be necessary to maintain subsidies or government services (to include health care and education), since people could afford to buy whatever TRIPOLI 00000896 002.2 OF 003 they needed directly. MEDIA BREATHLESS ABOUT OSTENSIBLE VIEW INTO JAMAHIRIYA POLICY DEBATE ... 4. (SBU) International media reaction - JANA broadcast the show, but state-owned media has otherwise not dwelled on it - has largely focused on the unusual spectacle of the ostensible policy debate that took place. Libya watcher and Dartmouth University professor Dirk Vandewalle opined that the meeting reflected the fact that top-down decision-making in Libya was being increasingly questioned and that the power of technocrats had increased. Reuters characterized it as "a rare glimpse into decision-making in the North African country". ... BUT LOCAL OBSERVERS REMAIN UNCONVINCED 5. (C) Observers closer to the scene have been less sanguine, and several senior GOL officials - including those involved in the meeting - had previewed for us in earlier meeetings that lack of agreement about how to implement government restructuring and privatization meant that implementation would be delayed and the scope likely reduced. As reported ref B, CB Governor Bengadara told a visiting U.S. trade specialist in October that while he favored a more aggressive "shock therapy" approach to economic reform than many other senior GOL leaders, he expected the wealth distribution program to take several years to implement and was frankly skeptical about the extent of government restructuring. Dr. Mahmoud Jibril, who heads the Economic Development Board (EDB) and National Planning Council and also leads the five committees tasked with implementing al-Qadhafi's vision, told visiting NEA/MAG Director Stephanie Williams on November 5 that nothing had been firmly decided with respect to government restructuring or privatization of education and healthcare (further details on the Williams-Jibril meeting septel). Conceding that the implementing committees had made little progress in agreeing on a plan, he suggested that change would be unlikely until after the first quarter of 2009. (Note: The General People's Congress typically meets in March; we've been told that they would have to formally bless any restructuring or privatization plans before they could be implemented. End note.) Similarly, Secretary of the General People's Committee for Manpower, Employment and Training (minister-equivalent) Matuq Matuq told us on November 13 that GOL leaders had encountered difficulty in trying to develop plans to implement al-Qadhafi's vision, and flatly told us that privatization and government restructuring would be delayed considerably. SAIF AL-ISLAM'S BEHIND-THE-SCENES ROLE A MIXED BLESSING 6. (C) Part of the issue appears to be that the restructuring and privatization initiatives have become lightning rods for the struggle between the old guard and would-be reformers. Over the summer, contacts told us the five implementing committees had been unable to achieve consensus on whether and how to implement the reforms. A supra-committee under Dr. Jibril was formed to coordinate the implementing committees' work; however, Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi - who had formed shadow committees composed of staff from his Qadhafi Development Foundation - has played a powerful and at times leading role in shaping implementation plans. A contact at the EDB told us that Saif al-Islam's involvement was a blessing and a curse. His personal status allowed him to advocate more forcefully than most GOL officials; however, the fact that he is at odds with influential members of the regime's old guard raised the stakes in the debate about restructuring and privatization. 7. (SBU) Implementation of the Leader's vision has already been delayed. When he outlined his vision in March, al-Qadhafi called for the five committees to submit plans for implementing the project by September 1, with the idea that he would detail the plan in his annual Revolution Day speech on/about September 1 and that the changes would be initiated before year's end. He disappointed those hopes, instead shifting the goalposts in his Revolution Day speech by saying the committees would submit implementation plans by year's end, and that changes would begin early in the new year (ref C). 8. (C) Comment: While the televised meeting was noteworthy for the fact that it offered the unusual spectacle of ostensible dissent in the sterile Libyan political environment, the fact that a number of the participants raised their hands to publicly dispute the reforms, together with al-Qadhafi's strident insistence on implementing the original plan, smacks of staged TRIPOLI 00000896 003.2 OF 003 political theater. Local observers have expected for some time that al-Qadhafi would in the end - as he's done before - significantly scale back the scope of the reform agenda he announced in March. By explicitly linking the reforms to the populist issue of anti-corruption, al-Qadhafi has seized the moral high ground on an issue of genuine public concern, which would allow him to blame venal GOL officials for failing to execute his vision if the original plan is modified. Doing so would allow him to limit real reform, and would mitigate to a certain extent criticism of the Jamahiriya system that is his brainchild. More cynical contacts have speculated that al-Qadhafi's intent all along was to raise the specter of privatization - particularly of education and healthcare - and government restructuring to make the increasingly creaky Jamahiriya system seem favorable by comparison in the eyes of a largely conservative, risk-averse Libyan public. According to that line of thinking, al-Qadhafi - concerned that Libya's economic opening was creating pressure for political reform - floated the privatization and government restructuring policy balloon largely as a means by which to muddy the waters and create an atmosphere of "constructive chaos" in which to effect limited (vice sweeping) change. It's a tactic he has used before: Libyan contacts are fond of telling the fable of a race in which participants have to carry a sack of rats a certain distance before they chew through the bag. Al-Qadhafi wins because he figures out that by constantly shaking the bag, the rats are too disoriented to make their way out. End comment. GODFREY 2008-11-18 2011-02-01 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI64 AL-QADHAFI: THE PHILOSOPHER-KING KEEPS HIS HAND IN 2009-01-28 2011-02-01 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI155 THE FROGMAN WHO COULDN'T SWIM: A COOPERATION CAUTIONARY 2009-02-17 2011-02-01 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI157 2009-02-18 2011-01-31 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI192 FOR ORDINARY LIBYANS, IT'S THE ECONOMY, STUPID REF: A) TRIPOLI 133, B) TRIPOLI 0001, C) TRIPOLI 0068, D) 08 TRIPOLI 699, E) TRIPOLI 186 CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, U.S. Dept of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 2009-02-27 2011-01-31 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tripoli
09YAOUNDE369 FY09 PROHIBITION ON ASSISTANCE TO CENTRAL 2009-04-22 2011-01-31 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Yaounde
09TRIPOLI413 2009-05-21 2011-01-31 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tripoli
10KABUL348 Afghanistan's Anti-Corruption Unit Obtains First Conviction 2010-01-27 2011-01-28 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kabul
10CAIRO203 FORMER HOUSING MINISTER RESIGNS FROM PARLIAMENT AMIDST 2010-02-15 2011-01-28 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Cairo
10KABUL672 ELECTIONS, KANDAHAR AND KARZAI 2010-02-23 2011-01-23 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Kabul
09ABUJA202 NIGERIA: SARAKI ON PRESIDENT'S HEALTH, NEED FOR 2009-02-04 2011-01-22 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Abuja
10ATHENS57 2010-01-29 2011-01-11 CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN Embassy Athens
08NAPLES37 ORGANIZED CRIME IN ITALY II: HOW ORGANIZED CRIME DISTORTS 2008-06-06 2011-01-07 CONFIDENTIAL Consulate Naples
08NAPLES38 ORGANIZED CRIME III: CONFRONTING ORGANIZED CRIME IN 2008-06-06 2011-01-07 CONFIDENTIAL Consulate Naples
08NAPLES96 CAN CALABRIA BE SAVED? 2008-12-02 2011-01-07 CONFIDENTIAL Consulate Naples
09NAPLES69 SICILY: REGIONAL GOVERNMENT IN TURMOIL WHILE THE MAFIA IS 2009-06-15 2011-01-07 CONFIDENTIAL Consulate Naples
10SOFIA32 BULGARIAN SOCCER RECEIVES A RED CARD FOR CORRUPTION 2010-01-15 2010-12-30 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Sofia
09YAOUNDE608 C) CENTRAL BANK SOURCE: "GABONESE STOLE $40 2009-07-07 2010-12-28 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Yaounde
09SANTIAGO867 CHILE: Conservatives Beat Back Skeleton in Pinera's Closet 2009-10-09 2010-12-27 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Santiago
07NASSAU273 CABINET MINISTER RESIGNS OVER PHOTOS WITH ANNA 2007-03-06 2010-12-21 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Nassau
08SANTODOMINGO1371 FORBES ENERGY CITES CORRUPTION IN ETHANOL PROJECT 2008-08-29 2010-12-17 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Santo Domingo
09SANTODOMINGO570 DOMINICAN REPUBLIC IS BAD FOR BUSINESS, SAYS 2009-05-18 2010-12-17 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Santo Domingo
09ACCRA1179 GHANAIAN CONCERN OVER DRUG SMUGGLING BY VIP 2009-11-10 2010-12-14 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Accra
09TUNIS372 TUNISIAN CRITICIZES REGIME IN FORTHCOMING BOOK; 2009-06-16 2010-12-13 CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN Embassy Tunis
08RANGOON749 BURMESE CIVILIAN OFFERS TO SELL PURPORTED URANIUM 2008-09-23 2010-12-12 SECRET Embassy Rangoon
10BAKU54 AZERBAIJAN: WHO OWNS WHAT? PART 1 - THE FIRST 2010-01-27 2010-12-12 SECRET Embassy Baku
09KAMPALA1401 UGANDA: TULLOW SEES CORRUPTION IN OIL SALE 2009-12-17 2010-12-09 SECRET Embassy Kampala
09ZAGREB644 PM KOSOR STRENGTHENING POLITICAL WILL TO FIGHT 2009-10-30 2010-12-09 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Zagreb
10ZAGREB53 CROATIAN PROSECUTORS INVESTIGATING FORMER PM AND 2010-01-26 2010-12-09 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Zagreb
10ZAGREB97 PODRAVKA CORRUPTION CASE TIED TO XXXXXXXXXXXX AND 2010-02-12 2010-12-09 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Zagreb
08ABUJA320 S/NF) NIGERIA: KANO BUSINESSMAN ALLEGES YAR'ADUA 2008-02-21 2010-12-08 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Abuja
09NAIROBI1829 VISAS DONKEY: CORRUPTION 212(F) VISA DENIAL 2009-09-01 2010-12-08 SECRET Embassy Nairobi
09NAIROBI1830 VISAS DONKEY: CORRUPTION 212(F) VISA REVOCATION 2009-09-01 2010-12-08 SECRET Embassy Nairobi
09NAIROBI1938 VISAS DONKEY: CORRUPTION 212(F) VISA DENIAL 2009-09-16 2010-12-08 SECRET Embassy Nairobi
10NAIROBI59 U.S. POLICY TO ADVANCE THE REFORM AGENDA 2010-01-12 2010-12-08 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Nairobi
09MAPUTO713 RISING CONCERNS ABOUT NARCOTRAFFICKING AND MONEY 2009-07-01 2010-12-08 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Maputo
09MAPUTO1291 IMPORTANT DRUG TRAFFICKING TRANSIT POINT FOR EAST 2009-11-16 2010-12-08 SECRET Embassy Maputo
10MAPUTO80 NARCOTRAFFICKING ON UPSWING, CONCERNS ABOUT 2010-01-25 2010-12-08 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Maputo
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