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Reference ID Subject Created Released Classification Origin
08TRIPOLI526 LIBYA SEEKS TO BLACKMAIL EUROPEAN MISSIONS FOR VISAS 2008-07-03 2011-02-01 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI592 THUG LIFE: HANNIBAL AL-QADHAFI'S ARREST PROMPTS FISSURE IN 2008-07-22 2011-02-01 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI63 2009-01-28 2011-02-01 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tripoli
05SAOPAULO1321 H2B VISAS: THE GOOD, THE BAD AND THE UGLY 2005-12-01 2011-02-01 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Consulate Sao Paulo
06BRASILIA2379 EMBASSY BRASILIA R1 VALIDATION STUDY 2006-11-09 2011-02-01 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Brasilia
08TRIPOLI6 LIBYA IMPOSES NEW CURRENCY REQUIREMENT FOR TOURISTS 2008-01-07 2011-01-31 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI372 PD PROGRAMS FALL VICTIM TO BILATERAL TENSIONS REF: TRIPOLI 289 2008-05-08 2011-01-31 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI242 2009-03-19 2011-01-31 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI268 FRAUD SUMMARY-TRIPOLI-MARCH 2009 REF: 08 STATE 74840 TRIPOLI 00000268 001.2 OF 003 1.The following responses are keyed to reftel. a. COUNTRY CONDITIONS: Fraud Level: Low. Tripoli provides the full range of American Citizen Services, but until January 2009, only processed those visas for which applicants are exempt from biometrics and personal appearance requirements, primarily A and G visas. As of January 25, 2009, we began to process selected categories of nonimmigrant visas, and opened for full services on March 25, 2009. Because of Libya's longtime isolation, there are few pull factors from the United States, as the Libyan diaspora in the US is very small. Because Libya is a relatively wealthy country, push factors are also mitigated. Libyan documents are generally unsophisticated, featuring few, if any, security features, and we also have heard reports that genuine documents with apocryphal information are obtainable from the authorities, possibly for a fee, but also through family connections. In addition, the host-country government is extremely reluctant to share or confirm information about its citizens with us, which limits our ability to conduct investigations. Further to this, the GOL requires that all law-enforcement related inquiries proceed through only one designated host government security service point of contact. While RSO at post is extremely supportive, our inability to develop consular law enforcement contacts limits ability to conduct anti-fraud work. b. NIV FRAUD: Because Post has only begun to process visas other than A and G, we have seen little conventional fraud involving presentation of false documents. However, we have seen cases where we suspect applicants of using their personal connections to obtain a genuine diplomatic note to get a visa for personal travel, and avoid fees and interviews. We have confirmed with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) in all of these cases that the diplomatic notes are genuine, and have issued the visas in accord with the request. We continue to follow up in these cases to ensure that the applicants in question return to Libya, but have seen no new instances of overstays. one stayed far longer than his putative job as a diplomatic courier could possibly require. We continue to monitor these cases closely. Post has heard reports from other Embassies that Libyan visa applicants sometimes get false job letters from friends who work at prominent international companies. Post has implemented a Business Visa Program which allows member companies to register with us, and provide sample signatures of all employees authorized to sign job letters for visa applicants. All of our employment-based cases so far have involved petitions from international oil companies; we have detected no evidence of any fraud. c. IV FRAUD: Tripoli began to accept petitions for immigrant visas from resident AmCits, but Tunis continues to interview these cases. We have not seen any instances of fraud or questionable relationships. We do note that Libyan applicants often present the "Family Book" as both birth and marriage certificates. While this is a valid civil document, we require a birth and marriage certificate, both of which are available. All three documents are handwritten, and contain no security features to speak of. We have no exposure to employment-based IVcases. d. DV FRAUD: Tripoli does not process DV applications, and has received no inquiries regarding potential DV fraud from other Posts. We have received inquiries from DV applicants who have either seen advertisements or received e-mail from "service providers" offering assistance completing the DV forms, andhave placed a general warning about the use of service providers for any visa services on our website. e. ACS AND U.S. PASSPORT FRAUD: Embassy Tripoli resumed full passport and ACS services in FY-2007. Most claims are from first-time adult passport applicants, and are based upon birth in the United States while a parent was attending university. These cases require more time to review than most, in large part due to reliance upon Libyan documents to establish the identity of applicants. However, the vast majority of applicants are able to produce both parents' passports from the time of their birth, with visas and entry stamps confirming presence in the United States, as well as surprisingly vast amounts of supporting documentation . We routinely ask for two forms of identity documents from adult passport applicants because of increasing concerns about the potential vulnerability of the Libyan passport as an identity document. Libya issues a national identity card to its citizens at age 16, and most Libyans also hold a drivers' license. Both of these documents TRIPOLI 00000268 002.2 OF 003 include a photo, but are only in Arabic. f. ADOPTION FRAUD: Local law does not allow for the adoption of a Libyan child by foreign nationals. Only a resident US citizen who is married to a Libyan national or is a dual-national can adopt in this country. To date, Post has received only one general inquiry regarding adoption in Libya, and has not seen a case. g. USE OF DNA TESTING: Post has not had any cases referred for DNA testing to date. h. ASYLUM AND OTHER DHS BENEFITS FRAUD: Post receives infrequent reports of a lost/stolen I-551. We have begun to process these cases in close coordination with DHS colleagues in Paris and Rome. We have not detected any efforts at fraud or misrepresentation in this area. We have not processed any VISAS 92/93 cases. i.ALIEN SMUGGLING, TRAFFICKING, ORGANIZED CRIME, TERRORIST TRAVEL: While Libya is a transit and destination country both for economic migrants and victims of trafficking, especially from sub-Saharan Africa to Europe, it is not a center for the production of false documents. Traffickers and smugglers operating in Libya tend to focus on providing boat travel to Europe for migrants, who often seek asylum on arrival. Libya does have vast borders in the Sahara which are extremely difficult to police. Estimates indicate that 1.5-2m irregular (illegal) migrants are present here but live outside Libyan mainstream society. Post knows that European Embassies routinely require a U.S. visa in order to issue a Schengen transit visa for travel to the United States, but has received no inquiries or reports regarding possible imposters or other misuse of U.S. travel documents in order to reach another Western country. In the few months we have processed NIV's, we have not noted any TCN applicants who appear to be possibly involved in smuggling or trafficking-most are executive-level employees of international oil or construction companies. j. DS CRIMINAL FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS: Post's ARSO's previous assignment was as an RSO-I, and Post has an SOP for referring fraud cases to RSO. However, to date, we have not had any cases to refer to DS. k. HOST COUNTRY PASSPORT, IDENTITY DOCUMENTS, AND CIVIL REGISTRY: Libyan passports and civil documents are uniformly handwritten, frequently contain errors, and have few if any security features. None have biometrics or machine-readable features. While both marriage and birth certificates are available, the document in everyday use to show relationships is the Libyan "Family Book." The book has a blue or green cover, and is issued to men when they get married. A man's family book contains only his photo, and data about his wife and children. Unmarried people are in their father's family book, except in the case of widows, who are the only women who can have their own book. Libya issues both national identity cards and drivers licenses, handwritten in Arabic only, with a photo. We use these as secondary evidence of identity. Despite how easy it would be to counterfeit Libyan documents, we have not seen or heard of cases where identity is falsified. The Libyan passport is the only document that has an English translation, handwritten on one of the last pages. The GOL has said that it is planning to use one national ID number which will identify a person from the registration of their birth through their entire life. Under this scheme, passport numbers would remain the same for a person's entire life. It is not clear how the GOL would register lost or expired passports under the scheme, or if old passports would remain valid. The GOL is in the process of modernizing its passport; it has provided us with a series of prospective dates for the rollout of a more modern document, some as early as last year. The new passport and identity documents are currently slated for release by September. The GOL has not shared an exemplar of any new passport. More troubling are reports from the Maltese Embassy, one of the busiest visa-issuing countries in Libya, that they have identified genuine Libyan passports issued with erroneous data. Libyan passports include a note if the passport is a replacement for an older passport. This notation, according to the Maltese, can be "forgotten" if the prior passport would reveal inconvenient truths about the applicant's travel history. This calls the integrity of the Libyan passport as an identity document into question. Post is not aware of any trend in alteration of Libyan passports. The passport agency and civil registry began the process of "correcting" the last names of TRIPOLI 00000268 003.2 OF 003 Libyan citizens, many of whom, as is common in the Arab world, use an ancestor's first name as their last name. The applicant told us that this practice was no longer acceptable, and that the GOL was now requiring the use of "family" or clan last names instead. In Arabic, there are routinely four names in the Libyan passport--the applicant's first name, the father's and grandfather's first names, and then the family name. The handwritten English translation of the passport rarely contains a full translation of these four names--more frequently, one or both of the middle names is written as an initial only. When changes are made, no mention of any previous passports issued in another identity is necessarily mentioned. We routinely use the "alias" fields in the consular applications to counteract the potential for use of alternate identities by mala fide applicants. Both Tunis and Tripoli use only the passport number on Libya passports. In September 2008, Tunis detected numerous duplicates in their database. Contact with the Libyan Passport Agency indicates that in addition to the six-digit passport number, three "series" letters are used. The Arabic letters "wow," "ha",and "ya," as well as "no letter" serve to differentiate the passport series. These letters do not appear on the passport data page. Post continues to attempt to find a way to capture these letters in the consular applications without causing problems for visa holders at POE, where inspectors would notice a mismatch between the visa and the passport data page. l. COOPERATION WITH HOST GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES: While our relationship with Libya is improving, it remains complicated. Many routine requests must be submitted by diplomatic note, and even then, are often ignored. The Consular Section is not allowed by the GOL to have any contact with host-country law enforcement, as all such contact must be between RSO and a designated GOL liaison. Even with close cooperation with RSO, working through this channel often requires repeated requests for the same information. In addition, the GOL has repeatedly expressed concern about sharing its citizens' personal data with foreign governments, which will further complicate efforts to investigate identity fraud. m. AREAS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN: As we open for visa processing, we anticipate applications from Libyans for whom travel to Tunis has been a financial burden. Most of these applicants will likely be unqualified, and will have more reason to resort to fraud in their applications. We are working with other Embassy sections, and with other Embassies in Tripoli to develop our understanding of how applicants here will attempt to overcome 214(b). Early indicators are that demand is lower than expected, and few unqualified applicants are presenting themselves for interviews. n. STAFFING AND TRAINING: The section chief serves as FPM. He has not had any specific Fraud Prevention training in the past five years. There is no dedicated LES fraud prevention position. All local staff is sensitized to fraud issues and understand the importance of both internal controls and our external image in relation to fraud prevention. When translation is needed in visa or passport cases, we use our native Arabic-speaker Consular Associate to avoid the appearance that a Libyan employee has influence into the visa or passport process. All new staff are required to take FPP on-line training courses as part of their orientation. CRETZ 2009-04-01 2011-01-31 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI269 FRAUD SUMMARY-TRIPOLI-MARCH 2009 REF: 08 STATE 74840 TRIPOLI 00000269 001.2 OF 003 1.The following responses are keyed to reftel. 2009-04-01 2011-01-31 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI495 FM KUSA: "STEP BY STEP" APPROACH TO VISA FOR AMERICANS 2009-06-22 2011-01-31 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI496 FM KUSA: "STEP BY STEP" APPROACH TO VISA FOR AMERICANS 2009-06-22 2011-01-31 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI497 FM KUSA: "STEP BY STEP" APPROACH TO VISA FOR AMERICANS 2009-06-22 2011-01-31 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Tripoli
09SECTION02OF03QRIPOLI583 BEYOND LOCKERBIE: WRITING THE NEXT CHAPTER OF THE US-LIBYA RELATIONSHIP 2009-07-20 2011-01-31 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI583 BEYOND LOCKERBIE: WRITING THE NEXT CHAPTER OF THE US-LIBYA RELATIONSHIP TRIPOLI 00000583 001.2 OF 003 CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 2009-07-20 2011-01-31 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI584 BEYOND LOCKERBIE: WRITING THE NEXT CHAPTER OF THE US-LIBYA RELATIONSHIP TRIPOLI 00000584 001.2 OF 003 CLASSIFIED BY: Joan Polaschik, Charge d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 1.(S/NF) Summary. Your visit to Libya will set the tone and agenda for the bilateral relationship over the next several months. Libyan officials seek clarification of the Administration's policy toward Libya, especially after their mishandling of the Fathi al-Jahmi case, and are unsure of the degree of engagement they can expect. They continue to complain that Libya has not been adequately "rewarded" for previous policy decisions to give up its WMD programs and support for terrorism, yet they are remiss in meeting key WMD deadlines. You can lay out the path toward increased engagement in the wake of the new Washington consensus and press for real progress. Potential deliverables from the visit include: a statement announcing the intention to engage in a Human Rights Dialogue and a Political-Military Dialogue with high-level State officials; Libya's signing of the HEU-LEU transfer agreement; formation of a visas working group to discuss bilateral visa problems; and setting a date to sign a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA). You can also privately raise the notion of establishing a Civil-Nuclear Dialogue, incumbent upon GOL signing of the HEU-LEU transfer agreement. The Libyans will be looking for a concept of how we envision conducting the human rights dialogue and assurances regarding the possibility of a meeting between POTUS and Qadhafi on the margins of UNGA. They will also continue to press for security assurances. End Summary. 2009-07-20 2011-01-31 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI599 2009-07-27 2011-01-31 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI638 PRODDING LIBYA TO ACTION ON TIME SENSITIVE ISSUES REF: A) TRIPOLI 599; B) TRIPOLI 632 TRIPOLI 00000638 001.2 OF 003 CLASSIFIED BY: Gene Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 2009-08-05 2011-01-31 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI639 PRODDING LIBYA TO ACTION ON TIME SENSITIVE ISSUES -- CORRECTED COPY REF: A) TRIPOLI 599; B) TRIPOLI 632; C) TRIPOLI 638 TRIPOLI 00000639 001.2 OF 003 CLASSIFIED BY: Gene Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 2009-08-05 2011-01-31 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI695 LIBYAN MFA REQUESTS DIPLOMATIC CLEARANCE FOR QADHAFI'S PLANE, TAKES STEPS TO DEMONSTRATE COMMITMENT TO RELATIONSHIP REF: TRIPOLI 692 TRIPOLI 00000695 001.2 OF 002 2009-08-27 2011-01-31 SECRET Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI740 EMBASSY TRIPOLI RESPONSE: 64TH UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY HIGH LEVEL ATTENDANCE AND REQUESTS FOR MEETINGS REF: STATE 68590 2009-09-14 2011-01-31 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI772 FRAUD SUMMARY - TRIPOLI - SEPTEMBER 2009 REF: 08 STATE 74840 TRIPOLI 00000772 001.2 OF 003 1.The following responses are keyed to reftel. 2009-09-30 2011-01-31 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI773 FRAUD SUMMARY - TRIPOLI - SEPTEMBER 2009 REF: 08 STATE 74840 TRIPOLI 00000773 001.2 OF 003 1.The following responses are keyed to reftel. 2009-09-30 2011-01-31 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI832 SWISS PONDERING TOUGH NEW MEASURES IN LIGHT OF LIBYAN INTRANSIGENCE REF: TRIPOLI 763 TRIPOLI 00000832 001.2 OF 002 2009-10-19 2011-01-31 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tripoli
10TRIPOLI58 EUROPEAN DCM'S ON LIBYA ISSUES CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 2010-01-21 2011-01-31 SECRET Embassy Tripoli
10TRIPOLI78 SENIOR LIBYAN JUSTICE OFFICIAL: LESS TALK, MORE ACTION IS BEST TRIPOLI 00000078 001.2 OF 002 2010-01-27 2011-01-31 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tripoli
10TRIPOLI79 TECHNOLOGY TO TOURISM: HEAD OF INVESTMENT AUTHORITY DISCUSSES OPPORTUNITIES FOR U.S. BUSINESS IN LIBYA 2010-01-28 2011-01-31 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tripoli
10TRIPOLI91 SWISS SCORE IN LIBYA: HAMDANI CLEARED OF IMMIGRATION CHARGES REF: A) TRIPOLI 73; B) TRIPOLI 58 2010-02-01 2011-01-31 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Tripoli
10TRIPOLI100 HEAD OF LIBYAN IMMIGRATION: U.S. BUSINESSMEN ARE WELCOME CLASSIFIED 2010-02-04 2011-01-31 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tripoli
10TRIPOLI106 TRIPOLI VISAS VIPER REPORT: JANUARY 2010 2010-02-09 2011-01-31 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Tripoli
10TRIPOLI112 2010-02-10 2011-01-31 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tripoli
10TRIPOLI114 GOL FUNDING INCREASING NUMBERS OF STUDENTS IN U.S. UNIVERSITIES TRIPOLI 00000114 001.2 OF 003 1.(SBU) 2010-02-10 2011-01-31 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Tripoli
10TRIPOLI134 LIBYA MAKES GOOD ON THREAT TO DECLARE SCHENGEN VISA WAR REF: TRIPOLI 112 TRIPOLI 00000134 001.2 OF 003 CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 2010-02-16 2011-01-31 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tripoli
10TRIPOLI137 MEETING OF LIBYAN, ITALIAN AND MALTESE FOREIGN MINISTERS LIKELY TO LEAD TO RESOLUTION OF SCHENGEN VISA CRISIS 2010-02-17 2011-01-31 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tripoli
10TEGUCIGALPA2 AMBASSADOR AND PRESIDENT-ELECT LOBO DISCUSS NEED 2010-01-05 2011-01-29 CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN Embassy Tegucigalpa
10CAIRO344 ILLEGAL ADOPTIONS IN EGYPT 2010-02-22 2011-01-28 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Cairo
10KUWAIT166 VISA REVOCATION KUWAIT 2010-02-24 2011-01-28 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Kuwait
03THEHAGUE2113 TERRORIST FINANCE:THE HAGUE - NOTIFICATION OF 2003-08-21 2011-01-27 SECRET Embassy The Hague
10AMSTERDAM8 VISAS VIPER WATCHLIST NOMINATION 2010-02-26 2011-01-19 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Consulate Amsterdam
06REYKJAVIK22 FRAUD SUMMARY - ICELAND 2006-01-18 2011-01-13 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Reykjavik
07REYKJAVIK335 ICELAND DEMANDS APOLOGY IN DETENTION CASE 2007-12-13 2011-01-13 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Reykjavik
07REYKJAVIK336 ICELANDIC TRAVELER DETAINED BY DHS IN NEW YORK CREATES 2007-12-13 2011-01-13 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Reykjavik
07REYKJAVIK337 ICELAND MEDIA ROUNDUP: MEDIA FIRESTORM OVER DEPORTATION 2007-12-14 2011-01-13 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Reykjavik
07REYKJAVIK346 Icelandic Foreign Ministry welcomes DHS letter on 2007-12-19 2011-01-13 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Reykjavik
08REYKJAVIK44 HAGUE ADOPTION LETTER DELIVERED TO GOVERNMENT OF ICELAND 2008-03-27 2011-01-13 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Reykjavik
08REYKJAVIK275 ICELAND: CONSIDERING RESPONSE TO PROPOSAL FOR TERRORIST 2008-11-25 2011-01-13 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Reykjavik
09REYKJAVIK23 ICELAND SIGNS TIFA, PUSHES FOR E VISAS 2009-01-28 2011-01-13 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Reykjavik
09REYKJAVIK30 ICELAND CENTRAL BANK CRISIS: ODDSSON'S NAILS FLAG TO MAST 2009-02-09 2011-01-13 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Reykjavik
09REYKJAVIK132 64TH UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY: PRELIMINARY INFORMATION ON 2009-08-06 2011-01-13 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Reykjavik
09REYKJAVIK140 ICELAND TO SEEK HIGH LEVEL MEETING AT UNGA 2009-08-17 2011-01-13 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Reykjavik
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