Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 3436 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
QA
YM YI YE

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Browse by 2011/02/01

<< 1 .. 1 2 .. 4 >>
Reference ID Subject Created Released Classification Origin
07SOFIA1271 STRATEGY TO SHAPE BULGARIA'S MILITARY MODERNIZATION 2007-10-29 2011-02-01 SECRET Embassy Sofia
07COLOMBO1506 SRI LANKA: DELIVERY OF FATF GUIDANCE REGARDING IRAN REF: A. SECSTATE 149648 B. COLOMBO 1439 C. COLOMBO 1307 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires James R. Moore for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 2007-11-02 2011-02-01 SECRET Embassy Colombo
07KAMPALA1752 2007-11-13 2011-02-01 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kampala
07TBILISI2862 MEETINGS WITH GEORGIAN OFFICIALS ON PREVENTING 2007-11-19 2011-02-01 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Tbilisi
07LONDON4311 POSSIBLE NUCLEAR SMUGGLING INCIDENT/OFFER OF 2007-11-21 2011-02-01 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy London
07BRATISLAVA630 NUCLEAR SMUGGLING INCIDENT AT PRIBENIK, SLOVAKIA REF: 06 STATE 163201 Classified By: Lawrence R. Silverman, Deputy Chief of Mission, for reason 1.4 (b) and (d) 2007-11-29 2011-02-01 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Bratislava
07TASHKENT2063 WMD PORTAL DETECTION IN UZBEKISTAN 2007-12-03 2011-02-01 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Tashkent
07TASHKENT2081 UPDATE ON WMD PORTAL DETECTION IN UZBEKISTAN REF: A. STATE 163194 B. TASHKENT 2063 Classified By: DTRA Fred Carter and Poloff Steven Prohaska for reasons 1.4 (b, d). 2007-12-05 2011-02-01 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Tashkent
07BRATISLAVA648 UPDATE ON NUCLEAR SMUGGLING INCIDENT AT PRIBENIK, SLOVAKIA REF: A. 06 STATE 163201 B. BRATISLAVA 00630 Classified By: Lawrence R. Silverman, Deputy Chief of Mission, reason 1 .4(b) and (d) 2007-12-06 2011-02-01 SECRET Embassy Bratislava
07TOKYO5492 2007-12-07 2011-02-01 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tokyo
07YEREVAN1420 NUCLEAR SMUGGLING OUTREACH INITIATIVE: INITIAL 2007-12-13 2011-02-01 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Yerevan
07TASHKENT2171 WMD PORTAL DETECTION UPDATE: LEGAL RESTRICTIONS ON OPENING THE RAIL CAR REF: A. STATE 163194 B. TASHKENT 2063 C. TASHKENT 2081 D. TASHKENT 2090 Classified By: DTRO Chief Fred Carter and Poloff Steven Prohaska for re asons 1.4 (b, d). 2007-12-27 2011-02-01 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Tashkent
08TASHKENT43 RADIATION DETECTION UPDATE: GOVERNMENT OF UZBEKISTAN PASSES QUESTION RESPONSES, COMMISSION'S FINDINGS REF: A. 07 STATE 163194 B. 07 TASHKENT 2063 C. 07 TASHKENT 2081 D. 07 TASHKENT 2090 E. TD-314/79205-07 Classified By: Poloff Steven Prohaska and DTRO Chief Fred Carter for re asons 1.4 (b, d). 2008-01-10 2011-02-01 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Tashkent
08ASTANA54 2008-01-11 2011-02-01 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Astana
08KABUL266 NUCLEAR SMUGGLING INCIDENT/PORTAL DETECTION AT 2008-02-02 2011-02-01 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kabul
08KABUL297 UPDATE: NUCLEAR SMUGGLING INCIDENT AT KABUL, 2008-02-05 2011-02-01 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kabul
08ISLAMABAD581 BIOSECURITY ENGAGEMENT PROGRAM: BALANCING PUBLIC HEALTH WITH 2008-02-09 2011-02-01 SECRET Embassy Islamabad
08KAMPALA266 NUCLEAR SMUGGLING INCIDENT/PORTAL DETECTION IN KAMPALA- FEBRUARY 12, 2008 REF: SECSTATE 162091 2008-02-12 2011-02-01 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Kampala
08BERLIN210 AUSTRALIA GROUP: GERMANY WELCOMES U.S. INPUT ON 2008-02-20 2011-02-01 SECRET Embassy Berlin
08THEHAGUE173 NETHERLANDS/AUSTRALIA GROUP: PLENARY INFO EXCHANGE 2008-02-25 2011-02-01 SECRET Embassy The Hague
08CANBERRA198 AUSTRALIA GROUP: PLENARY INFORMATION EXCHANGE AND 2008-02-27 2011-02-01 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Canberra
08ROME274 AUSTRALIA GROUP: ITALIAN PARTICIPATION IN PLENARY 2008-03-05 2011-02-01 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Rome
08BEIJING1263 S) SHIELD S06-08/S18-05/S26-06: CHINA URGED TO 2008-04-03 2011-02-01 SECRET Embassy Beijing
08BEIJING1373 S) M/V IRAN TEYFOURI: PRC SAYS INVESTIGATION 2008-04-11 2011-02-01 SECRET Embassy Beijing
08KYIV768 UKRAINE: UNODC Nuclear Legislation Workshop - A Model for 2008-04-16 2011-02-01 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Kyiv
08UNVIEVIENNA215 IAEA: HAYWARD DELEGATION TOUR D,HORIZON WITH SENIOR AGENCY OFFICIALS Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte for reasons 1.4 b,d and h Summary -------- 2008-04-16 2011-02-01 CONFIDENTIAL UNVIE
08PARIS735 AUSTRALIA GROUP: 2008 INFORMATION EXCHANGE (IE) 2008-04-17 2011-02-01 SECRET Embassy Paris
08PARIS750 AUSTRALIA GROUP: PLENARY MEETING, PARIS, APRIL 14-18, 2008 REF: A. 07 MOSCOW 5535 B. 07 PARIS 2593 Classified By: ESTH/NP COUNSELOR ROBERT W. DRY FOR REASONS 1.4 (B), (D), (E), and (H). -------------------- SUMMARY AND OVERVIEW -------------------- 2008-04-18 2011-02-01 SECRET Embassy Paris
08TRIPOLI374 LIBYA'S NSC SOLICITS U.S. VIEWS ON CIVILIAN NUCLEAR COOPERATION & LETHAL MILITARY EQUIPMENT SALES REF: A) TRIPOLI 340, B) TRIPOLI 372 2008-05-08 2011-02-01 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI375 QADHAFI DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION: FATHI EL-JAHMI HAS RETURNED TO HIS HOME 2008-05-08 2011-02-01 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI382 DEATH OF KEY LIBYAN OFFICIAL HAMPERS COUNTER-MIGRATION EFFORTS REF: TRIPOLI 0050 TRIPOLI 00000382 001.4 OF 002 2008-05-12 2011-02-01 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI401 FATHI EL-JAHMI REMAINS IN HOSPITAL, DESPITE REPORTS OF HIS RELEASE REF: A) JOHNSON-STEVENS EMAIL 05/12/2008, B) TRIPOLI 375, C) TRIPOLI 229, D) TRIPOLI 280 2008-05-15 2011-02-01 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI402 POLITICAL-ECONOMIC REFORM, JAMAHIRIYA-STYLE 2008-05-16 2011-02-01 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI411 EMBASSY DENIED ACCESS TO DETAINED HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST 2008-05-22 2011-02-01 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tripoli
08NEWDELHI1489 NARAYANAN URGES BETTER BILATERAL UNDERSTANDING ON 2008-06-02 2011-02-01 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy New Delhi
08TRIPOLI430 DIE HARD IN DERNA 2008-06-02 2011-02-01 CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI442 MEETING OF AMU HEADS OF STATE - MINUS ONE - IN TRIPOLI; 2008-06-09 2011-02-01 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tripoli
08MOSCOW1647 SCENESETTER FOR COUNTERTERRORISM WORKING GROUP 2008-06-10 2011-02-01 SECRET Embassy Moscow
08TRIPOLI453 QADHAFI AND ASAD 2008-06-11 2011-02-01 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI455 LIBYA: MEETING WITH RETURNED GTMO DETAINEES UNDER USG-GOL TRANSFER FRAMEWORK MOU REF: A) STATE 14270, B) 07 TRIPOLI 1060, C) 07 STATE 163961, D) 07 TRIPOLI 723, E) 07 STATE 77783, F) 07 STATE 163961 CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, Dept of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (c), (d) 1. (S/NF) Summary: Post visited two returned Guantanamo detainees to confirm their welfare and whereabouts, and the legal basis on which they are being detained in Libya. One detainee's trial has been completed and he is awaiting a verdict on the four charges he faces; the case of the second detainee is expected to go to trial in the next two to three months. End summary. 2. (S/NF) At a June 10 meeting, P/E Chief interviewed separately returned Guantanamo detainees Muhammad Abdallah Mansur al-Rimi (AKA Abdul Salam Abdul Omar Sufrani, ISN 194) and Ben Qumu Abu Sufian Ibrahim Ahmed Hamouda (ISN 557) per ref A instructions. The meeting took place at a GOL security service facility in Tripoli, and was attended by a host government security official. The last visit to the two returned detainees took place on December 25, 2007 (ref B). ISN 194 3. (S/NF) Al-Rimi (ISN 194), who was returned to Libya in December 2006, said he had been detained at an External Security Organization (ESO) detention facility between December 2006 and June 2007, when he was transferred to the Abu Salim prison, located in the Tripoli suburbs. The security official explained that the Abu Salim prison is controlled and managed by military police; it is the facility at which terrorists, extremists and other individuals deemed to be particularly dangerous to state security are detained. Al-Rimi said he remains in solitary detention in a 15 foot by 15 foot cell and has not been mistreated. He is able to walk outside regularly, and is able to speak with other prisoners during exercise periods. He is provided with drinking water, tea and three meals a day. He does not have access to books, radio or television. He has access to medications and has been visited by a prison doctor on the occasions when he has been ill. Al-Rimi stated that members of his family have visited him three times since his return to Libya, most recently in March 2008. (Note: As reported ref D, their previous visits were in January and May 2007. End note.) 4. (S/NF) Asked about the condition of his arm and his teeth, about which he had previously complained (ref D), al-Rimi said both were better. He repeated his earlier claim (ref A) that he sustained the injury to his arm in 2004 or 2005 during a scuffle with U.S. soldiers who entered his cell to punish him for allegedly instigating a disturbance among several other prisoners. 5. (S/NF) Asked for his understanding of the legal basis on which he is being held and the status/schedule of any legal proceedings against him, al-Rimi said he was questioned by the ESO and Internal Security Organization (ISO) officials between his return in December 2006 and February 2008, when his case was transferred to the Prosecutor General's office. His case has subsequently been been tried and is currently with a panel of judges, who are reviewing it. His understanding is that he faces four charges: 1) membership in the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group; 2) membership in al-Qaeda; 3) forging a passport and travel documents and using them to exit the country, and; 4) failing to secure permission to exit the country when he left to fight in Afghanistan. Al-Rimi has court-appointed legal counsel. The Prosecutor General's Office told al-Rimi and his attorney that the court was expected to render a verdict in his case on/about June 16. A verdict had been expected on/about May 5; however, the trial was delayed. Al-Rimi does not know how long his prison sentence could be if convicted of one or more of the charges he faces; however, he claimed his attorney told him he stood a good chance of being acquitted and released. ISN 557 6. (S/NF) Hamouda (ISN 557), who was returned to Libya in August 2007, said he had been detained at an ESO detention facility for three months and was then transferred to the Abu Salim prison. He currently remains at Abu Salim, but understands he may be transferred next month to the Jdeida prison, which houses common criminals, in Ain Zaraa. He has been held in solitary detention since his return - his biggest complaint - and said he has not been mistreated. (Note: The security official explained that detention protocols for extremists and terrorists mandate that they be held in solitary detention to preclude the possibility that they could recruit other members of the prison population for extremist activities. End note.) He is not able to exercise at the Abu Salim prison, but was able to do so at the ESO facility before he was transferred. He is provided with drinking water, tea and three meals a day. He does not have TRIPOLI 00000455 002 OF 002 access to books, radio or television. He has access to medications and has been told he may be visited by a prison doctor if he is ill, but has not had need of one. Hamouda has had two visits by members of his family since his return: his wife and children visited in late December, and his wife and brother-in-law in January. He complained that his family had not visited since, but said he he did not know whether they had tried. (Note: He conceded that his wife had divorced him and remarried, and that relations between them were difficult; however, after the second visit, permission for further visits had to be obtained from the Prosecutor General's office, vice ISO. He speculated that the Prosecutor General's office may have been less efficient in processing visit requests. End note.) 7. (S/NF) Asked for his understanding of the legal basis on which he is being held and the status/schedule of any legal proceedings against him, Hamouda said he was questioned by ESO and ISO officials between his return in August 2007 and May 2008, when his case was transferred to the Prosecutor General's Office. His understanding is that he faces three charges: 1) membership in the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group; 2) membership in al-Qaeda, and; 3) that he performed illicit work for a private company in Sudan and Afghanistan. He also faces charges related to a drug trafficking offense for which he was convicted and imprisoned in the early 1990's. According to the security official, Hamouda escaped from prison and left Libya illegally in 1992 to travel to Sudan; he may/may face separate charges for escaping and leaving the country. Hamouda has no legal counsel, but said he does not want an attorney because he has committed no crimes. Claiming that if he were really a member of al-Qaeda " ~ the U.S. would have never returned me to Libya ~ ", he said his impression is that all of the charges against him are based entirely on hearsay from witnesses whose credibility is suspect. He has been told by the Prosecutor General that his trial may start in two to three months. Hamouda does not know how long his prison sentence could be if convicted for one or more of the charges he faces; however, he claimed that he had been granted a pardon by the Qadhafi Development Foundation for the original drug trafficking conviction and his subsequent escape from prison and illegal exit from Libya. 2008-06-11 2011-02-01 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI457 QADHAFI WORKS TO MUSTER ARAB OPPOSITION TO SARKOZY'S 2008-06-12 2011-02-01 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI458 CONDITIONS IN SECURITY DETENTION FACILITIES 2008-06-12 2011-02-01 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI466 CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): CONVERSION OF THE RABTA CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITY REF: A) STATE 58476, B) THE HAGUE 482, C) TRIPOLI 119 CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Dept of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 1. (C) Summary: The GOL's lead interlocutor on CWC issues told us: 1) conversion of the Rabta chemical weapons production facility would not be completed until December 2009 (which the GOL appears to have known since early 2006), 2) the GOL would not submit a new National Paper at the upcoming June 24-27 Executive Committee meeting of the OPCW, 3) GOL Delreps would/would read an official statement into the record of the EC's informal session that would address all points stipulated in ref A non-paper; 4) the GOL was ready to facilitate a bilateral visit by U.S. technical experts at any time, and; 5) despite delays, the GOL expects to complete destruction of chemical agents well before the deadline it agreed to with States Parties. End summary. 2. (SBU) P/E Chief conveyed ref A demarche points and non-paper on June 12 to Dr. Ahmed Hesnawy, who heads Libya's CWC compliance efforts, and Adel Ben Issa, who has the lead on CWC issues in the International Organization Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA/IO). Dr. Fathi Asseid, Technical Director of the General Company for the Manufacture of Pharmaceuticals and Medical Supplies, which controls the Rabta facility and a related pharmaceutical packaging plant, also attended the meeting. Stressing the GOL's commitment to transparency in declaring its CWC-related equipment, implementing conversion of the Rabta facility and destroying chemical weapon precursors, Dr. Hesnawy thanked the U.S. and U.K. for their "robust" support for Libya's efforts to date. Per ref A, copies of the non-paper and an oral brief on the demarche points were conveyed to U.K. and Italian Embassy counterparts in Tripoli. CONVERSION PROJECT 3. (SBU) On the points of the demarche, Hesnawy indicated the following: - CONVERSION DELAY: Conversation of the Rabta chemical weapons production facility will not be completed before November/December 2009. The GOL signed an original contract with Italian company PharmaChem on February 11, 2002; an addendum to that contract, signed on June 1, 2006 (which Hesnawy showed P/E Chief), stipulated that PharmaChem's portion of conversion work at the Rabta facility would be completed by September 2009. The GOL, factoring in possible unexpected delays, added three months to the timeline, yielding an expected completion date of December 2009. Hesnawy did not respond when asked why Libya had not notified States Parties earlier that conversion would be delayed if it had known since February 2006 that the contract with PharmaChem stipulated a completion date in late 2009. He insisted that the GOL would complete the conversion project and initiate production of pharmaceuticals at Rabta by December 2009. - NEW NATIONAL PAPER: Libya will not submit a new National Paper to the Executive Council (EC) meeting of the OPCW scheduled to begin on June 24. Noting that National Papers are to be submitted at least a month in advance of EC's for review by States Parties, Hesnawy pointed to the fact that the meeting was just ten days away and that there was not sufficient time for review. P/E Chief noted that we had asked since early May that the GOL immediately submit a new National Paper for review. Hesnawy had no response, but said Libya's delegation will instead submit an "official statement" during the Informal Session that would address all points stipulated in ref A non-paper. The informal statement would explain "completely" the reasons for missing the July 29, 2008 conversion deadline and the need for "a correction" to the conversion plan that would eliminate the requirement that a protective sandbag berm be removed. - VISIT BY U.S. TECHNICAL EXPERTS: Hesnawy and his MFA/IO counterpart stressed that the GOL stands ready to facilitate a visit to the Rabta facility by U.S. Embassy officials and/or U.S. technical experts - the U.S. side is "welcome to visit at any time - we have nothing to hide". Such a visit could occur before the upcoming EC meeting or after it. The GOL has already extended invitations through the Italian and U.K. Embassies for their capitals to send teams of technical experts. (Note: The Italian Ambassador and DCM, but not/not Italian technical experts visited Rabta on June 7. A U.K. technical team is notionally scheduled to visit July 6-9, 2008. End note.) Hesnawy stressed that the GOL was willing to accommodate a series of bilateral visits by technical experts, but was not/not willing to facilitate a visit by a combined team (i.e., of U.S. and U.K. experts) out of concern that the visit's agenda could be broadened. TRIPOLI 00000466 002 OF 003 - NEXT STEPS: Hesnawy indicated that he clearly understood that U.S. support for a conversion plan correction to allow retention of a modified protective berm depended on a commitment to transparency and conduct of a site visit to Rabta. He said that the GOL might/might be amenable to submitting a new National Paper at the next EC after the upcoming meeting in late June, indicating that the GOL would premise its decision in part on conversations with Delreps at the June 24-27 EC meeting. IRANIAN HARASSMENT DURING APRIL 2008 OPCW INSPECTION ALLEGED 4. (C) Referring to the April visit by an OPCW inspection team, Hesnawy complained that an Iranian inspector had raised issues with equipment in Building Number 3 and Building Number 4 that had since 2004 been mutually agreed to have been exclusively commercial in nature. According to Hesnawy, four previous tranches of OPCW inspectors had been informed of the equipment and assured the GOL that the equipment did not need to be declared. Referring to the GOL's decision to vote for a UN Security Council Resolution calling for a third tranche of sanctions against Iran because of its nuclear weapons program, Hesnawy said the Iranian inspector deliberately raised the issue of equipment in the commercial building to harass Libya in retaliation for its UNSC vote. Hesnawy claimed Iranian officials at the OPCW had conceded as much in conversations at The Hague with Libya's representative, Muhammad Gheton. "Libya feels it's being dragged back to 2004", Hesnawy complained, saying previous teams of inspectors should have raised the issue of the equipment earlier if it was indeed a subject of concern. DESTRUCTION: STATUS OF ITALIAN CONTRACT & PROJECT TIMELINE 5. (C) Regarding ref B reports that the timetable for Libya's destruction program had slipped, Hesnawy conceded that there had been delays; however, he maintained that Libya would nonetheless meet the deadline of the States Parties. The GOL envisions the project in two phases: 1) Repackaging of the agent from existing polyethylene containers (which has resulted in diffusion, vice leakage, of the agent) into improved containers for the 800 km trip from the Ruwagha facility in al-Jufra to the Rabta facility; and 2) actual destruction of the material. Hesnawy said the GOL will rely on Italian company SIPSA Enginerring and Libyan civil contractors to complete the repackaging and destruction work. Contract negotiations with the Italian company had been "completed" and terms were mutually understood by the GOL and SIPSA; however, the contract itself had not yet been formally approved by "all relevant GOL entities", according to Hesnawy. Additional details, such as securing GOL approval to establish requisite bank accounts and authority for letters of credit were also still being worked out. 6. (C) Hesnawy offered the following schedule for the destruction program: - January/February 2009: Repackaging of the agent takes place; agent is stored in Bunker 109 at al-Jufra until transport to Rabta in late 2009/early 2010; - March 2009: Construction completed on destruction building at Rabta facility; - March-October 2009: Destruction equipment installed in destruction building at Rabta facility; - December 2009: Cold and hot tests of destruction equipment at Rabta destruction facility; - Early February 2010: Commissioning of destruction facility at Rabta; - May 1, 2010: 1% of agent destroyed per agreement with OPCW. Hesnawy offered that SIPSA and the GOL estimated that destruction of all of the agent would require only 25 calendar days once destruction commenced at the Rabta facility. He anticipated no difficulty meeting the deadline for destruction of the agent, and predicted that Libya would complete the project well in advance of the deadline. 7. (C) Comment: Animated and at times angry, Hesnawy repeatedly stressed the GOL's annoyance at what it perceives as an "endless" series of questions about details of its conversion and destruction plans. Stressing that dignity was more important than anything in Libya, Hesnawy offered that GOL officials had considered whether it would be better to destroy the Rabta facility altogether rather than allow it to be used as a pretext for criticism of the GOL's intentions and performance TRIPOLI 00000466 003 OF 003 by "hostile international actors". STEVENS 2008-06-15 2011-02-01 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI467 DEVELOPMENTS IN CASE OF IDRISS BOUFAYED AND FELLOW REGIME 2008-06-16 2011-02-01 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI470 OIL- AND GAS-RELATED POLLUTION IN LIBYA 2008-06-16 2011-02-01 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI474 ENI'S OIL AND GAS DEAL EXTENDED, OTHER COMPANIES WORRY TERMS WILL SET A NEW (UNFAVORABLE) PRECEDENT REF: 07 TRIPOLI 912 1. (SBU) Summary: Soaring oil prices are allowing Libya to press for more stringent long-term contracts with foreign oil and gas producers. A twenty-five year extension for Italian firm Eni North Africa BV, which entailed a sizeable bonus payment and dramatically reduced the company's production share, was recently ratified after lengthy negotiations. The potential impact of Eni's deal is significant. Local observers expect that the National Oil Company's (NOC) success in securing very favorable terms will embolden it to pursue renegotiation of existing contracts with other international oil companies (IOCs). Despite Libya's relatively unique position in terms of unproven reserves, high quality oil and low recovery costs, observers here expect that some IOC's facing potentially long renegotiation periods and dramatically reduced production shares may choose to abandon production efforts in Libya. End summary. EPSA MODEL TIME-TESTED 2. (SBU) Libya's Exploration and Production Sharing Agreement (EPSA) rubric has been the most widely used model for producers in Libya since 1974. Under these agreements, international oil companies (IOCs) receive a fixed percentage of output from the fields involved based on the terms of their bid to explore and develop Libyan acreage. The terms of these agreements, particularly the share of overall production retained by companies, have grown increasingly less favorable to IOCs. Intense competition among foreign oil and gas companies to book reserves in Libya, widely perceived to be one of the relatively few places in the world with significant unproven reserves of sweet, light crude and natural gas, has fueled the trend towards less profitable EPSA's. 3. (SBU) As a point of comparison, the standard production share allocation for IOCs in the latest EPSA round (EPSA IV) has been 10-12% of overall production, down from production share allocations of 20% or more that were typical in earlier EPSA rounds. IOC's have accepted stiffer terms based on their high expectations of Libya's hydrocarbon producing potential, the comparatively low cost of oil recovery in Libya, the generally high quality of Libyan crude, Libya's close proximity to European markets and rapidly rising oil and gas prices. Encouraged by the willingness of some IOC's to accept production shares as low as 7 percent under the EPSA IV framework, the NOC - led by former Prime Minister Shukhri Ghanem, reputedly a hard bargainer - has been pressing all IOC's to accept further reductions in their production share allocations to increase Libya's take. Striking a nationalist tone, Muammar al-Qadhafi explicitly referred in his June 11 speech on the occasion of the "evacuation" of U.S. and British military bases in Libya to efforts to renegotiate EPSA contracts as a manifestation of Libya's continued resolve to resist Western imperialism. AT LONG LAST, ENI FINALIZES ITS CONTRACT EXTENSION 4. (SBU) In October 2007, ENI agreed with the NOC to convert its existing long-term production contracts, which were signed in the mid-1980s under EPSA III terms, to the most recent contractual model under EPSA-IV (reftel). That deal was submitted to Libya's General People's Congress for approval and ratification and was ratified on June 12. Under the new deal, Eni reduced its production share to 12% for oil (down from 35-50 percent for its various fields) and 40% for natural gas (down from 50 percent). The share for gas production will drop to 30% after 2018. In exchange, the NOC extended Eni's EPSA III contracts by 25 years, approved a 3 billion cubic meter (BCM) expansion to the Western Libya Gas Pipeline (WLGP), and the construction of a new 4 million tons per annum LNG facility at Mellitah. Eni accepted less attractive fiscal terms on its blocks (its overall portfolio has fallen by 42% due to lower production share figures), and made a $1 billion non-recoverable payment. Eni's licenses were converted to the EPSA IV model and will now expire in 2042 (for oil) and 2047 (for gas). OTHER DEALS IN THE OFFING? 5. (SBU) Several other major extensions are anticipated in the coming months, including those involving U.S. firm Occidental TRIPOLI 00000474 002 OF 002 Petroleum (along with Austrian partner OMV) and Petro-Canada. Those agreements were signed with the NOC in late 2007, but still require GPC ratification. It is possible the NOC will seek further concessions in light of its deal with Eni. Spain's Repsol and the NOC are renegotiating along the EPSA IV contractual model. The initial deal between Repsol YPF and NOC stipulated a 50-50 split of production; however, the NOC is now seeking a minimum production share of 72 percent. 6. (SBU) The NOC has approached numerous other IOCs about extensions, raising the possibility that it will reopen deals that were only concluded a few years ago. Even the U.S. Oasis Group (comprising Amerada-Hess, Marathon and ConocoPhillips), which paid $1.8 billion in December 2005 to return to acreage in Libya's Sirte Basin that it held before the suspension of U.S.-Libyan diplomatic ties and the imposition of U.S. and UN sanctions, may be affected. Libya's relatively modest 59.2 percent production share in that deal has generated preliminary probing by the NOC as to whether the Oasis Group would consider renegotiating, which it has so far successfully opposed. 7. (SBU) Comment: With ratification of its revised EPSA contract, Eni has secured a long-term position in Libya, but at a considerable price. Part of the calculus for Eni and other IOC's is the expectation that oil and gas prices are likely to remain high, making non-recoverable bonus payments and lesser production shares tenable from the standpoint of their projects' overall profitability. It is widely expected that the NOC will push hard to renegotiate other extant deals and extensions that involve reduced production shares for IOCs. Its confidence buoyed by favorable market conditions, Libya is playing hardball with the IOC's, sending a clear message that no deal is beyond renegotiation, no matter how recently concluded or how favorable the terms for the NOC. Libya and the IOC's have been here before: a spate of renegotiations and extensions occurred in the late-1960s and early 1970s, driven in part by the then-new al-Qadhafi regime to demonstrate to its people that it was a better steward of Libya's hydrocarbon resources than the Sanussi monarchy had been. As during that period, the current penchant for shifting the goalposts has not been well-received by the IOCs. Despite Libya's relatively unique position in terms of unproven reserves, high quality oil and low recovery costs, observers here expect that some IOCs facing potentially long renegotiation periods (and associated costs of idle personnel and materiel) and diminished production returns may choose to abandon altogether their production efforts in Libya. End comment. STEVENS 2008-06-17 2011-02-01 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI480 BUSINESS IS POLITICS: MARKS & SPENCER DRAMA TIED TO FATE OF 2008-06-18 2011-02-01 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI494 JOURNALIST JAILED FOR CRITICIZING GOVERNMENT'S 2008-06-22 2011-02-01 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI498 PETRO-CANADA SIGNS 30-YEAR PACT WITH LIBYA 2008-06-24 2011-02-01 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI505 NEGOTIATIONS OVER MIL-MIL MOU CONTINUE 2008-06-26 2011-02-01 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tripoli
<< 1 .. 1 2 .. 4 >>